LOL. The synchronized reaction from both of them was awesome

From Wikipedia: Solipsism is an epistemological or ontological position that knowledge of anything outside one's own specific mind is unjustified.

Actually I don't, but scientists still think it is. I think everything has to be granular to be logically consistent. I think it is interesting that the realm of the small is starting to show this as true. The state changes of atoms resemble this granular nature, like when light changes phases, it does it in desecrate steps. And the "noise" these very sensitive probes are getting can be leveled at space actually being discrete instead of infinitely reducible. My epistemology concerning science and math holds them in very high re-guard. But what they don't get us is "Truth" or certainty. Science deals with how humans understand the universe, I usually like to deal with how the universe must actually be; a subtle but completely different paradigm than most people concern themselves with.

I remember this popular science article where they had mathematicians asking philosophers about the implications of a formula he derived. The mathematician had time to the 4th power and didn't really understand what that would even mean in the real world. It was a funny read but adds to the notion that math is a beautiful castle, but in some ways it is a castle in the sky that lays un-anchored to reality. And that isn't to smack talk it, I use math and science rigorously. However, when talking of epistemology it is important to know the limits of a line of questioning.

But now I am babbling on.

--vive in all such circumstances.

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25,6-7: "The three cardinal values of the Objectivist ethics ... are: Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem, with their three corresponding virtues: Rationality, Productiveness, Pride.

"Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man's life..."

NA. Earlier, Rand told us that life is the only end in itself, and that one's own life is the purpose of each individual (25,2). She contradicts this by declaring something else to be the purpose of life.

Moreover, we have already seen that there is no reason within Rand's scheme why productive work is more morally virtuous than looting (comments 28-31).

(33)


25,7: "Rationality is man's basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues."

I agree with this; however, Rand can give no adequate basis for it. (See comments 20-24.)

(34)


25,7: "Irrationality is the rejection of man's means of survival and, therefore, a commitment to a course of blind destruction; that which is anti-mind, is anti-life."

I quote this to emphasize that Rand's view is that rationality is good only because it serves the end of 'life'; life is the only end in itself.

(35)


26,1: Rationality means a commitment to the principle "that one must never place any value or consideration whatsoever above one's perception of reality."

NA. How does this follow from her view of ethics? Rather, 'life' is supposed to be the highest value--one must place that above everything else. One's 'perception of reality' is only a means to furthering one's life, yet Rand seems to be saying that accurate perception is the ultimate end in itself.

(36)


26,1: "... It means one's acceptance of the responsibility of forming one's own judgments and of living by the work of one's own mind (which is the virtue of Independence)."

NA. How does this follow from the value of life? Why can't people survive while being dependent?

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26,1: "It means that one must never sacrifice one's convictions to the opinions or wishes of others (which is the virtue of Integrity)--that one must never attempt to fake reality in any manner (which is the virtue of Honesty)..."

NA. I skip over the rest of her elaborations on what rationality means, about which I would say the same thing. Granted, dishonesty and lack of integrity may sometimes lead to one's death (though not very often), but how can Rand justify these "must never" claims? She makes no attempt to argue that these things one allegedly must never do will, all of them, automatically kill you. That is what she would have to argue, given that life is the only ultimate standard of value.

I skip over her similar remarks about productiveness and pride.

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27,3: "The basic social principle of the Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end in itself, so every living human being is an end in himself, not the means to the ends or the welfare of others--and, therefore, that man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself."

Above (comments 7-8) we saw that Rand adopts a purely agent-relative conception of value: that is, a thing cannot be said to be good simply. Rather, a thing can only intelligibly be said to be good for (or: good relative to) someone. This is what the ethical egoist has to say.

Since "is an end in itself" means "is good for its own sake," it follows that nothing can be said to be an end in itself in any absolute sense; rather, one can only say a thing is an end-in-itself for someone or other.

Now, what does Rand mean in saying "life is an end in itself"? This appears to be using "end in itself" in an absolute sense, but perhaps she means only that each particular life is an end in itself for that particular living thing. What does she mean by saying every human being "is an end in himself"? Again, is she using this in an absolute sense, or a relative sense?

Case A: Assume she is using "end in himself" in an absolute sense here. In that case, she is contradicting her earlier claim that value is agent-relative (comment . Furthermore, it would seem to follow that every person has a reason for promoting the welfare of everyone, as an end in itself. That is, utilitarianism would seem to follow, which is not what she wants. She thinks one should promote one's own life as one's sole ultimate value. Which brings us to the second case.

Case B: Rand must mean this in an agent-relative sense: i.e., each individual human being is an end in himself for himself (but not for other people). So for me, my life is the only end in itself, whereas for you, your life is the only end in itself. This is consistent with what she has said up to now. But now what about the rest of the passage: "not the means to the ends or the welfare of others." Well, of course for me my life is an end in itself. But for other people, it is not; we just established that. So why wouldn't my life be for them just a means to their own ends? Why wouldn't my life from my neighbor's point of view be good only as a means to promoting my neighbor's life?

Similarly, what about the remark, "man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself"? Clearly, given that my life is, for me, the only end in itself, I would be irrational to sacrifice it for the sake of others. But why would I not be rational to sacrifice others to myself? True, their lives are ends in themselves for them; but what has that to do with me? For me, their lives are not ends in themselves, since only mine is. So why wouldn't it be good, for me, to sacrifice their lives for the sake of my own?

What seems to have happened here is that Rand slipped from the agent-relative theory of value into the absolutist conception.

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27,4: "In psychological terms, the issue of man's survival does not confront his consciousness as an issue of 'life or death,' but as an issue of 'happiness or suffering.'"

I think she means that, even though the good is in fact what serves our life (our survival), we aren't always aware of it as such; instead, we are aware of it as what makes us happy. In fact, what makes us happy does so because it promotes our life, but we're immediately aware of it only as what makes us happy.

(40)


27,4-5: "Emotions are the automatic results of man's value judgments integrated by his subconscious; emotions are estimates of that which furthers man's values or threatens them ... [T]he standard of value operating his emotional mechanism is not [automatic]. Since man has no automatic knowledge, he can have no automatic values; since he has no innate ideas, he can have no innate value judgements."

NA. There are a number of problems here.

First, Rand's claim that emotions result from value judgements is evolutionarily implausible. The other animals all have certain emotions, which we share (though we have a wider range of emotions)--e.g., fear, anger, love for one's offspring. But Rand would probably agree that the other animals do not make value judgments. Therefore, what she is saying is that at some time in our history, as humans broke off from the primate line, the emotional mechanisms of the animals got selected out, and then replaced by other mechanisms that induce us to have the same emotions.

Alternately, perhaps Rand would say that the other animals do have value judgments, but of a different kind: theirs are automatic and instinctive, whereas ours are not. Then again, she would be saying that the mechanisms that give the animals instinctive value judgments got selected out, and then replaced with mechanisms that lead us to make many of the same value judgments. (Cf. comment 21.)

Second, people can often have emotions that conflict with their value judgments, for instance, a person who experiences a fear of flying even though he knows that flying is perfectly safe.

Third, in order to claim, rationally, that people (a) have no innate knowledge, (b) have no innate values, and (c) have no innate ideas, Rand would have to cite some actual scientific evidence. This is armchair cognitive psychology. (Cf. comments 24, 25.)

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28,5: "Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one's values. ... [I]f a man values destruction, like a sadist--or self-torture, like a masochist--or life beyond the grave, like a mystic--or mindless 'kicks,' like the driver of a hotrod car--his alleged happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his own destruction. It must be added that the emotional state of all those irrationalists cannot be properly designated as happiness or even as pleasure: it is merely a moment's relief from their chronic state of terror."

28,6: "Neither life nor happiness can be achieved by the pursuit of irrational whims."

29,2: "Happiness is a state of non-contradictory joy--a joy without penalty or guilt, a joy that does not clash with any of your values and does not work for your own destruction. ... Happiness is possible only to a rational man..."

The initial claim is that happiness simply results from attaining one's values. But this is followed by the claim, apparently, that a person with the wrong values cannot experience happiness (or 'true' happiness).

Why wouldn't the 'irrationalists' experience happiness when they attained their goals? Perhaps Rand is saying that it is impossible for the irrationalists to attain their goals. Why? Rand implies that the 'irrational' goals are ones that lead to one's own 'destruction.' Now, there are two alternatives:

Case A: Suppose Rand means this literally: that those values, if attained, result in your being literally dead, i.e., not existing. Then we could understand why people with those values could not experience happiness (since they would be dead first). However, she has given no indication of why this would be true. Apart from the 'mystic' case, the other kinds of people she mentions do seem to be alive and to often get the things she says they seek (e.g., drivers of hotrod cars do get kicks). Why, therefore, are they not 'really' happy?

Case B: Suppose Rand meant their 'destruction' metaphorically, e.g., their ceasing to live the life proper to man. In that case, she has given no explanation for why these people would not experience happiness when they attain this improper state, given that it is what they value.

The third quotation suggests that perhaps Rand believes these people's pseudo-happiness is always tainted by guilt. But she has just told us (comment 40) that all our value judgements are chosen, not innate. So if someone chose the improper values, how would they feel guilt upon attaining them? Guilt would seem to presuppose that they somehow knew those values to be wrong; but by hypothesis, they don't, since they have such knowledge neither innately nor by choice.

The significance of this is that it is another example of Rand's failure to explain, in terms of her theory, why sadism, masochism, or various other things she believes to be wrong, are wrong.

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29,3: "The maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are not two separate issues. ... [W]hen one experiences the kind of pure happiness that is an end in itself ... one is ... affirming ... the metaphysical fact that life is an end in itself."

It is possible for a person to be alive but not happy, so how can it be that the maintenance of life is not a "separate issue" from the pursuit of happiness? Further, since Rand has said that life is the only end in itself, how can it also be that some kind of happiness is an end in itself?

This apparent contradiction could be resolved if and only if we assume that happiness is (that is, is exactly the same thing as) life. This is false, since a person can be alive but not happy--unless Rand wants to simply define "life" to mean "a happy life." But then her initial argument for why life is the ultimate value would not apply to this new sense of "life". (Cf. comment 27.)

Happiness, on Rand's theory of the emotions, is simply a signal that one is attaining one's values. It is the values themselves that are valuable; why would the mere signal be intrinsically valuable? Given the rest of her view, happiness could only be valuable as a means to furthering one's life.

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29,5: "This is the fallacy inherent in hedonism ... 'Happiness' can properly be the purpose of ethics, but not the standard. The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of achieving happiness. To declare, as the ethical hedonists do, that 'the proper value is whatever gives you pleasure' is to declare that 'the proper value is whatever you happen to value'--which is an act of intellectual and philosophical abdication..."

First, it is unclear how happiness, rather than life, can be the purpose of ethics, according to what Rand has said earlier.

Second, it is unclear what the distinction is supposed to be between the 'purpose' and the 'standard' of ethics. If one's purpose is X, then why wouldn't one's standard be simply: that which achieves X? Here is everything Rand has to say about this:

25,3: "The difference between 'standard' and 'purpose' in this context is as follows: a 'standard' is an abstract principle that serves as a measurement or gauge to guide a man's choices in the achievement of a concrete, specific purpose. 'That which is required for the survival of man qua man' is an abstract principle that applies to every individual man. The task of applying this principle to a concrete, specific purpose--the purpose of living a life proper to a rational being--belongs to every individual man, and the life he has to live is his own."

I take it that survival qua man is the same thing as living a life proper to a rational being. The difference between the 'standard' and the 'purpose' in this example, then, seems to be that the 'standard' is something that applies to everyone--it is 'the life proper to a rational being'--while the 'purpose' is made specific to a single person--e.g., 'my living the life proper to a rational being.' Why this is a significant distinction escapes me. In any case, none of this explains why happiness could be a 'purpose' but not a 'standard.' Apparently, she is claiming that 'happiness' can be specific and concrete but not abstract?

Leaving that aside, the complaint against the hedonists seems to be one of circularity. They are not giving a genuine standard of value, since one's experience of pleasure depends on one's already having values; one then experiences pleasure as a result of attaining those values. This, however, is false. Children do not experience pleasure when eating ice cream because they believe that eating ice cream is good; quite the reverse. (Cf. comments 21, 24, 40.)

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30,2: "The philosophers who attempted to devise an allegedly rational code of ethics gave mankind nothing but a choice of whims: the 'selfish' pursuit of one's own whims (such as the ethics of Nietzsche)--or 'selfless' service to the whims of others (such as the ethics of Bentham, Mill, Comte and of all social hedonists, whether they allowed man to include his own whims among the millions of others or advised him to turn himself into a totally selfless 'shmoo' that seeks to be eaten by others)."

This passage is misleading about the history of ethics.

First, it implies that there are some philosophers who held that people should turn themselves into totally selfless shmoos that seek to be eaten by others, but, while she names some 'social hedonists', she does not tell us who she thinks held the 'shmoo' theory. Perhaps she meant Comte (inventor of the term "altruism")--but Comte did not believe that 'altruistic' behavior was self-destructive. Nor did Bentham or Mill think that somehow, other people's pleasure had value but one's own did not.

Second, Rand seems to be using "whim" as a term of abuse. Utilitarians believe that one ought to bring about the most overall pleasure or happiness in the world that one can, but they certainly do not think this amounts to pursuing whims. Rand does, but it is unclear what she is saying is a whim here. The utilitarians advocate pursuing pleasure. So, is pleasure, itself, a whim? Perhaps Rand means that the desire for pleasure is a whim. More likely, she is applying her theory (see comment 43) that one will only experience pleasure when something happens, if one antecedently desired that thing--and it is the desires whose satisfaction causes pleasure that she is calling 'whims'.

Why would those desires be 'whims'? Perhaps Rand's point is simply that some of them are whims--i.e., that people can get pleasure from satisfying whimsical desires, and the hedonists do not discount those kinds of pleasures--those pleasures are just as intrinsically good as any other pleasures, according to the hedonists (except for Mill). This is a genuine objection to some forms of hedonism. Nevertheless, Rand's remarks are at best misleading--they suggest, to a reader unfamiliar with whom Rand is talking about, that these 'hedonists' all say: "A person should just pursue solely whims, of himself or of others, with no exercise of reason." Which, of course, is false.

The significance, again, is that Rand is able to illegitimately make her theory seem more plausible by attacking straw men.

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30,5: "[W]hen one speaks of man's right to exist for his own sake, for his own rational self-interest, most people assume automatically that this means his right to sacrifice others. Such an assumption is a confession of their own belief that to injure, enslave, rob or murder others is in man's self-interest..."

The omission of quantifiers is used to great effect here. When they hear the idea that an individual should always do whatever serves his own interests, most people assume this means his right to sacrifice others. They are thereby 'confessing' their belief that it could be in someone's interest, some time, to injure, enslave, rob, or murder someone else. If one removes the italicized quantifier terms in the above, Rand sounds much more reasonable.

However, Rand has given no evidence for the conclusion that it is never in anyone's interest to harm anyone else (see comments 27-31).

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31,3: "The Objectivist ethics holds that human good does not require sacrifices and cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of anyone to anyone. It holds that the rational interests of men do not clash..."

NA.

This would be a good time for a general remark about all the ethical claims Rand makes about what the life of man qua man requires, or what a rational person would value, and so on--that is, all her ethical claims after the claim that life is the ultimate value.

Not only does Rand gives virtually no argument for any of them, but she has given us no criterion of what is 'rational'--unless we are to take the criterion, 'what serves life is rational.' Let us consider four cases:

Case A: The rational is what serves your life, and "life" means continued existence. In that case, Rand needs to give an argument that you will literally, physically die if you do any of the things she says are wrong, or refrain from the things she says are right. For instance, if you hurt another person, drive a hotrod car (28,5), or marry a slut (32,1), you will die.

Case B: The rational is what serves your life, and "life" means "the sort of life proper to a rational person." This is circular.

Case C: The rational is what serves your life, and "life" means "the life of man qua man," where this does not just mean "the sort of life proper to a rational person." In that case, Rand has given us no criterion for what does or does not serve the life of man qua man.

Case D: The rational is what serves your life, and "life" means something other than (A), (B), or (C). In this case, Rand has not told us what she means.

Case E: The rational is something other than "what will serve your life." In this case, given what she said earlier, what is 'rational' cannot be used as a criterion for ethical judgement, since she already told us that what serves life is the only legitimate such criterion.

I think this problem is extremely significant. The problem is that--whichever one of these cases holds--"rational" and "man qua man" are simply fudge words. That is, their function in the theory is that they enable Rand to claim almost anything she likes as being supported by her theory, and also to reject any attempt to infer conclusions that she doesn't want from the theory.

I give a couple of examples to show what I mean by a "fudge". First, imagine I declare boldly, "No real philosopher has ever denied the law of non-contradiction." You respond: "What about Nicholas of Cusa, who thought that God has all properties, including contradictory ones?" I say, "Oh, he's not a real philosopher. He's more of a theologian." You: "Okay, how about Hegel?" Me: "Oh, he's not a real philosopher. He's much too incomprehensible to be a real philosopher. Only analytic philosophers count." You: "Okay, how about Graham Priest? He's an analytic philosopher, and he denies the law of non-contradiction." Me: "Oh, he's not a real philosopher. Have you seen his book, In Contradiction? It's terrible." Now, you can imagine that in each of these cases, an interminable debate might spawn about whether my stated rationale justified denying the figure in question the status of 'real philosopher.' In the course of the debate, I make a bunch of declarations about who is and isn't a 'real' philosopher, but I never come out with a precise, unambiguous criterion of 'real-philosopher-ness'. In this case, I am using "real" as a fudge word. That is, it is a word that insulates my thesis from decisive testing, because any proposed counter-example can, if I choose, be immediately bogged down in interminable debates about who is real qua philosopher. So I am never forced to give it up. At the same time, at the end of this debate, I can declare victory, since no one found a counter-example to my thesis. I probably won't convince anyone else, unless they were already favorably disposed toward my thesis, but I can almost certainly convince myself that I gave good reasons for rejecting each of the proposed counter-examples.

Second example. This one is more realistic. On a television program investigating his psychic powers, Uri Geller instructed the audience to phone in if anything unusual happened during he program. At the end, several people phoned in reporting bizarre occurrences that took place during the show. Geller claimed that this supported psychic powers (I'm not sure if he meant because he had psychically predicted these events, or because the TV show had psychically caused them, or just because the events themselves were inherently psychical). Of course, we know this is nonsense. But since Geller did not precisely define "unusual", nor was it known how many people were watching the show, no one could calculate the prior probability of unusual events happening during the show, and thus no one could actually prove that what Geller claimed was nonsense. This meant that people who wanted to believe in psychic powers could do so, and could interpret Geller's remark about unusual events as predicting the events the callers described. Geller used "unusual" as a fudge word.

Third illustration, but this one is an example of non-use of fudges. In scientific testing of drugs, it is standard to use "double blind" tests. This means that half the subjects are given placebos, and neither the patients nor the physicians observing the results know who has the placebo and who has the drug. Now, why keep the physicians 'blind'? The answer is, because it is too easy to fudge--that is, to interpret results favorably if you want the drug to be successful. Scientists know this, and they impose this restriction on themselves, to prevent themselves from fudging. (You don't always know when you're fudging.)

So a 'fudge word' is a word that functions to make fudging easy. "Rational" and "man qua man" are Rand's fudge words. She never gives a precise and unambiguous criterion for their applicability. Thus, suppose someone tries to argue that, on Rand's theory, it would be morally acceptable to steal from people, provided you could get away with it. Then she has at least two fudges she can employ (probably more): (a) She could claim that this is not in your interests, because there is always a risk that you might get caught, and it's not worth it. This works because no one knows how to calculate this risk, so no one can actually refute this claim. This is the sort of thing I have seen many Objectivists do. However, Rand doesn't do this in "The Objectivist Ethics"; she goes for the second sort of fudge: (b) She can claim that although you would gain money from this, it would not be in your rational interests, or it would not be serving the life of 'man qua man', or that it would reduce you to a 'subhuman' status. Thus, she can immediately bog down the counter-example in an interminable debate about what is or isn't 'rational', 'subhuman', etc., because no precise and unambiguous criterion of the rational, or the human, has been identified. She gets to make it up as she goes along.

Now, let's look at her definition of "rationality":

25,8: "The virtue of Rationality means the recognition and acceptance of reason as one's only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values and one's only guide to action."

Does this obviate my 'fudge word' charge? Not at all. Whenever she encounters a behavior she disapproves of, she can declare that the person is not accepting reason as his only guide to action. The above 'criterion' just refers the fudge word "rational" back to the fudge concept of what is "supported by reason". If Rand could give us a precise, unambiguous list of what reason recommends and why, then this charge would be answered.

Rand's following list of things that rationality 'means' is filled with further fudge words. Here are some of the concepts that can be fudged: the notion of using full focus in all choices (if x makes a choice I don't like, I can claim he wasn't in full focus), the idea of a commitment to 'reality', the idea that values must be 'validated' and 'logical', the idea of living 'by one's own mind', etc.

Now, I am not saying here that all of those concepts are bad concepts and should never be used--any more than I think the concept "real" or "unusual" should never be used. Often we have no choice but to use vague concepts. But we should recognize that they are not like scientific and mathematical concepts. They are concepts whose application requires interpretation.

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32,6: "[N]o man may initiate the use of physical force against others. ... Men have the right to use physical force only in retaliation, and only against those who initiate its use."

NA. Again, Rand would have to show how this follows from the premise of life as the standard of value--i.e., she would have to demonstrate that if you initiate the use of force, you will automatically die. 'Automatically', because she is saying you must never initiate force, so she must hold that you could never do it and not die.
Notes

1. All references are to "The Objectivist Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness, paperback edition (New York: Signet, 1961), pp. 13-35.

2. I have cited passages where Rand mentions the connection between 'is' and 'ought' and where she discusses the standard of 'life' as an action-guiding principle. Unfortunately, she did not clearly distinguish 9 from 12, but it is clear she meant to assert 12.

3. All quotations are from "The Objectivist Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness, paperback edition (New York: Signet, 1961), pp. 13-35.

4. The book is Ethical Theories, ed. A. I. Melden (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

5. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New York: NAL Books, 1990), p. 29.

6. "Intrinsically good" in ethics means the same as Rand's "an end-in-itself": i.e. a thing which is good for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of something else to be obtained by means of it.

>> ^chilaxe:
Re:HadouKen24
You do seem well-informed on this topic.

1) "These give us an "in" for something like an empirical analysis."
It doesn't seem similar to empirical analysis if people's experiences of mystical feelings are all mutually contradictory. One person believes he or she senses one thing when reading a religious book, and another person senses nothing.

Strictly speaking, simply having a feeling when reading a book is not a mystical feeling. It is just a feeling. I am referring more to things like the [i]writing[/i] of the Bible or the contact that the Oracle of Delphi was said to have with Apollo.

2) "Why should we expect it to conform to the standards of a scientific epistemology?"
These videos are intended for the portion of the population that's open to a rationalist approach. If scientific thought builds civilizations, with their advanced medicine and space travel, and religious thought doesn't have a history of verifiable achievements, a portion of the population will regard the balance of evidence as favoring a rationalist approach.

Sure, a scientific approach is extremely useful for developing new kinds of vehicles, safer homes, and so on. No one denies that. It is not at all clear to me how or why a scientific approach ought to be taken for all phenomena or to explain all ways of thinking about things.

There are a number of philosophical and religious positions which are utterly undecidable on the grounds of science and, if correct, render science woefully incomplete. One must evaluate these positions according to criteria other than scientific, such as coherency, consistency, etc.

3) "If an image of the Japanese Sun goddess Amaterasu were to materialize and defuse all our nuclear weapons, I don't think it would be unreasonable to take as our starting hypothesis that Amaterasu really did just finally prevent a nuclear holocaust. "
Yes, if there was a verifiable supernatural event, that would constitute some evidence.
However, using mystical feelings as evidence, as most people would, doesn't seem to be supported by the balance of evidence when neurotheology, the neuroscience of theology, is taken into account. (Since 1994, neuroscience has been breaking down exactly what happens in order to (assumedly) create mystical feelings... e.g. turn off the neural circuits responsible for the sense of division between self and world, and suddenly we feel "connected to all things.")
Not everyone believes in relying on the balance of evidence, but this video is intended for those who do, or to at least give folks a sense of the advantages of relying on the balance of evidence.


The "balance of the evidence" is that, when you put people having similar religious experiences in an MRI machine, you see similar things happening in their brains, and the things you see are more or less the kinds of things you'd expect to see whether or not you believe there is an anomalous element to the experience.

"Neurotheology" is not nearly advanced enough to come to any conclusions about the ultimate nature of such experiences, and may in fact be incapable of making such conclusions.

>>HadouKen24
Thank you for a well-reasoned point of view from the opposite side. We're seeing way too little of that.

1) It's a bit erroneous for QualiaSoup to claim that the spiritual or supernatural realms proposed by various religions are conceived as realms we have no connection to or ability to contact or explore. If that were the case, then all religion would be a non-starter. Rather, the claim is that there are points of contact--specifically, those central to the particular religion, such as the temples and oracles of ancient Greece, or the revelation of Holy Scripture in Christianity. These give us an "in" for something like an empirical analysis.

QualiaSoup does indeed assume that the spitiual realms or deities of religions are unknowable. I'll show you why:

2) Skeptics treating God concepts as scientific hypotheses is getting a little tiring. It's not intended as a scientific statement; why should we expect it to conform to the standards of a scientific epistemology? It is, in fact, the primacy of such an epistemology which is under contention.

There, you said it yourself. Treating God as a scientific hypothesis is simply a sophisticated way to say that you demand a reason to believe in it. This reason has to be either some sort of evidence or some logical or philosophical argument. As QualiaSoup points out, the philosophical arguments are flawed. So skeptics seek evidence for God.

It seems like you are trying to evade the question by having it both ways. First you assert that God does have an effect on our daily lives, through points of contact with our world. Then you refuse to treat these effects as potential evidence requiring analysis.

Re:HadouKen24

You do seem well-informed on this topic.


1) "These give us an "in" for something like an empirical analysis."

It doesn't seem similar to empirical analysis if people's experiences of mystical feelings are all mutually contradictory. One person believes he or she senses one thing when reading a religious book, and another person senses nothing.


2) "Why should we expect it to conform to the standards of a scientific epistemology?"

These videos are intended for the portion of the population that's open to a rationalist approach. If scientific thought builds civilizations, with their advanced medicine and space travel, and religious thought doesn't have a history of verifiable achievements, a portion of the population will regard the balance of evidence as favoring a rationalist approach.


3) "If an image of the Japanese Sun goddess Amaterasu were to materialize and defuse all our nuclear weapons, I don't think it would be unreasonable to take as our starting hypothesis that Amaterasu really did just finally prevent a nuclear holocaust. "

Yes, if there was a verifiable supernatural event, that would constitute some evidence.

However, using mystical feelings as evidence, as most people would, doesn't seem to be supported by the balance of evidence when neurotheology, the neuroscience of theology, is taken into account. (Since 1994, neuroscience has been breaking down exactly what happens in order to (assumedly) create mystical feelings... e.g. turn off the neural circuits responsible for the sense of division between self and world, and suddenly we feel "connected to all things.")

Not everyone believes in relying on the balance of evidence, but this video is intended for those who do, or to at least give folks a sense of the advantages of relying on the balance of evidence.

There are a few things about this video that I feel I should comment on.

1) It's a bit erroneous for QualiaSoup to claim that the spiritual or supernatural realms proposed by various religions are conceived as realms we have no connection to or ability to contact or explore. If that were the case, then all religion would be a non-starter. Rather, the claim is that there are points of contact--specifically, those central to the particular religion, such as the temples and oracles of ancient Greece, or the revelation of Holy Scripture in Christianity. These give us an "in" for something like an empirical analysis.

2) Skeptics treating God concepts as scientific hypotheses is getting a little tiring. It's not intended as a scientific statement; why should we expect it to conform to the standards of a scientific epistemology? It is, in fact, the primacy of such an epistemology which is under contention.

3) QualiaSoup's point about the inconclusiveness of miracles is well-received--but it is on the same continuum as arguments that we can't know if we are just brains in vats being fed stimuli by mad scientists. If an image of the Japanese Sun goddess Amaterasu were to materialize and defuse all our nuclear weapons, I don't think it would be unreasonable to take as our starting hypothesis that Amaterasu really did just finally prevent a nuclear holocaust. To be sure, scientific investigation may then question that claim and open it to further scrutiny which may or may not confirm the hypothesis, but that does not mean that, prior to such disconfirmation, we do not have at least some good reason to believe in Amaterasu.

All empirical judgments must be made in terms of our background knowledge. Part of that background knowledge is our knowledge of popular religious beliefs. If we have an independently verifiable experience which matches well with the religious beliefs of our--or perhaps another--culture, then we would have grounds to at least provisionally accept at least some of those beliefs--if only in modified form.

4) Finally, it is certainly the case that the kind of demanding pushiness that Soup criticizes is thoroughly unpleasant and unreasonable. Private reasons to believe in a God or gods do not justify that sort of behavior. His words on the problems with that particular attitude toward faith are perfectly appropriate. I worry a bit that the problems with the video will make it difficult for reasonable Christians and Muslims (since those are the two groups I see engaging in that sort of "dialogue") to perceive where he does in fact hit the mark.

If he's not going to phrase things in a manner that such people will respond to, it would be nice if he could present a few comments on the aspects of those two particular religions that encourage such attitudes and behavior. It seems to be strongly linked to monotheism--Judaism has less of such problematic attitudes, but they are still present, and seem to have been much more present in ancient Judaism. In polytheistic traditions, one tends to find a much higher respect for debate and diversity of thought. One need only look at the vigorous debates between Greek philosophers, who could agree on the subject of the gods no more than in any other areas, or the staggering profusion of religious practices and beliefs to be found in India. It is misleading to speak of such traditions as "tolerant;" the word implies that it takes some effort of will to maintain civility, when in fact polytheists tend to accept such diversity as a matter of fact.

siaiaia (or whatever your name is), you are in dire need of an education in both religion and epistemology. Not all knowledge is scientific knowledge. One can have historical knowledge, knowledge of art theory, the knowledge of the human condition which has informed so many poets and novelists, musicology... The list goes on and on. Which is to say that there is no reason why one should expect that a religious truth (if such a beast exists) should be classified as scientific.

Furthermore, your understanding of religions as primarily sets of doctrines--systems beliefs--is profoundly inadequate. Let's ignore the Eastern religions, for all of which that's not clearly not true, and look at an example from Western history. In the first century BCE, Roman orator and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote a book entitled De Natura Deorum, or On the Nature of the Gods. In it, he portrays a fictional but plausible conversation between himself, a Stoic philosopher, and an Epicurean philosopher. Throughout the dialogue, it becomes starkly clear that, though all three follow the Roman religion, they can barely find a single belief about the gods that they hold in common. This detachment of doctrine and religion--of dogma and religious practice--was the norm throughout the ancient Mediterranean world.

Only with the rise of Christianity does anything like your criticism of religion become even coherent, let alone plausible.




With regards to the palestinian bomber - why did the IRA not do suicide bombing?? Eh? Because the palestinian bomber believes he is doing something in the name of God, and doing a righteous thing before he dies.

Or maybe because it's one of the few acts that a Palestinian can take with any effectiveness against Israeli oppression.

Suicide bombing was not invented by Muslims, but by Hindu Tamils. And not for religious reasons--both murder and suicide are strongly enjoined every Hindu tradition I'm familiar with. The problem was that one group--the native Sinhalese (primarily Buddhist--a pacifistic religion)--was oppressing the Tamil minority. They invented the suicide bomb as a technique by which a minority could strike at a militarily powerful oppressor.

There are strong parallels between the Palestinians and the Tamils. In both cases, the rulers speak a different language than the oppressed minority, having a different culture right down to religion. In both cases, the majority overwhelmingly outguns the minority. In both cases, oppression of the minority is acceptable to the populace of the majority group.

It is unsurprising, then, that the Palestinians should have adopted the suicide bomb--no matter what their religion. There was a complex set of circumstances replicated in both circumstances which produced the kind of attitude which gives rise to a suicide bomber.



This does not, of course, apply to the 9/11 hijackers, the Taliban, or a number of other groups. Nonetheless, I think my point is clear: fixating on a single aspect of a society, like religion, to explain complex social phenomena is a huge mistake.

^I think you've got it backwards, cybrbeast. Regardless of the sophistication of the instruments used, or the elaborateness of the mathematical permutations, science will never penetrate the primacy of perception or adequately explain the phenomenon of experience without severe distortions, deletions, and generalizations which misappropriate the instances of perception as a complete gestalt. You are correct that, from a scientific point of view, these theories "make little sense," but this is due to an inadequacy of science, not of the theories themselves. Inasfar as science perpetually attempts to causally interpret the phenomena of experience as third-person adumbrations, it will limit itself to logical opacity, falling short of the lived first-person perspectives which constitute the living human predicates. When you eat a peach, you need not take measurements or abstract experimental conditions into account prior to biting into it in order to gain an appreciation or epistemological experience of the fruit. Rather, there is a knowingness, in which your perception remains primary to any "objective" cognition, from which I believe psychedelic insights/intuitions seem to avail to its aspirant. In this way, these theories are hidden to the naive subject, only to become apparent as obvious once the authentic experience has been undergone.

Structure of Behavior

danny

"Perhaps if i was able to have a conversation with someone who knew it back to front, then i would be able to give a better opinion on whether or not it would work."

Go ahead, ask any question you want. I will converse with you. I don't know everything about it, but I have agreed with and advocated it without regrets for 43 years.

But first be clear that you are only dealing in this particular issue with one portion of her philosophy, politics. And that politics is not a stand-alone set of principles. Its validity depends entirely on the more fundamental branches of Objectivism that define the nature of existence (metaphysics), the nature of our means of grasping and retaining our knowledge of existence (epistemology), and given the nature of those and of human beings (in principle), by what standards we should measure our choices of thought and action in our quest to survive and thrive in accordance with our nature as the beings that we are (ethics).

That is just a peek at the monumentality of the subject. But you do not have to be an Olympic swimmer before you can wade into the shallows. Also, it doesn't make any difference where you start. If you have an open, honest mind, it will take you where you need to go.

Since politics is at the top of your present interest list, start here:

Capitalism is not right because it works. Rather, it works because it is right. It is right because it is derived from and dependent on a proper definition of the nature of human beings. To wit: Life or death is the fundamental alternative for all living entities. Humans are the only living beings that cannot pursue either alternative by their automated bodily functions alone. Our unique means of survival is our capacity to know the nature of existence and to choose the actions we take to deal with it - i.e., we are rational, volitional beings.

If one chooses the alternative goal of death, no ethical or political system is needed. But if one chooses to live -- to survive and thrive -- then life itself becomes ipso facto the standard of measure for all of your choices of how to think and act and what values to pursue - your ethics. If you lived outside of any society, your ethic -- your moral rights and wrongs would be your only governor. You would succeed or fail in accordance to how correctly or incorrectly your ethic was defined and implemented in your daily life.

But when humans live together in a society and interact in long term relationships, a problem arises. The volition that enables us to choose, inherently enables us to err. The autonomy one would have over one's own life outside a society can be destroyed in a society by the sole enemy of freedom, physical force. Therefore, in order to extend a proper human ethics in the context of the life of an individual into the context of a society of men, coercion by physical force must be removed from human interactions and all exchanges of values among men must be voluntary.

Now re-read the defining principle of Rand's radical capitalism as I stated it in my comment above. That is a moral principle. If you can undermine the logic of the morality underpinning that principle, we can begin to talk about capitalism not working. But, if you can't, you should begin to look deeper into it than you have. For if autonomy is a moral prerequisite, then our present political system that condones the use of coercion by majorities to take what they want from minorities is the system that does not work. It does not work primarily because it is immoral. And the left and right are equally guilty. Only the kinds of tyranny they favor differ.

Note also, that it is a dangerous leap from being unable to imagine how a system you understand so little would function to the claim that it simply would not work at all. Your intolerance of bastards is a suitable example. What Rand achieves in her system is that bastards may continue to be bastards in spades, because they have in her system no access to power. The government in her system has but one job and no other: rid the nation of coercion. No one can acquire anything from anybody in such a society without enticing them to trade it to them voluntarily.

And keep in mind, that autonomy is the freedom to exercise your own volition, which is a freedom to be fallible yourself that you must grant others as well. To be a good capitalist, you must tolerate the absolute right of others to be as irrational as they want so long as they do not force it on you or anyone else.

>> ^Fletch:
You reject the Abrahamic God for lack of evidence, but don't understand why atheists reject any kind of "divine existence"?

No, I understand it. I just think it's misguided. My point was simply that there is evidence of a sort for some kind of divine presence. But that evidence does not lend itself very well to scientific analysis.

Seriously? Are you really in the "there must be SOMETHING out there" camp?

No, I just love a good philosophical debate, especially about things like epistemology. I don't necessarily believe in any kind of divine presence, I just don't reject the possibility on the same grounds that I do the Abrahamic god.

Its a trick question. The answer is neither.

I value science because it provides me with reliable, practical information. Such information is useful for improving my everyday life; while unreliable or impractical information is at best a waste of time and a worst detrimental or life threatening—so recognizing and avoiding such information is important not only to my happiness but to my health and long term survival.

Science, then, is a way of filtering information. The internal mechanism, of course, is the scientific method. This method is important because it is the actual process which filters out unreliable, impractical information.

Strictly speaking, the scientific method is a list of best known methods (BKM). Over time it has evolved into this:

1. Define the question
2. Gather information and resources (observe)
3. Form hypothesis
4. Perform experiment and collect data
5. Analyze data
6. Interpret data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for new hypothesis
7. Publish results
8. Retest (frequently done by other scientists)

Each of the above eight steps also have best known methods (BKM). For example, the BKM for #4 (Experiment) include double blind groups and controls, while the BKM for #5 (Analyze) include statistical analysis.

“Science” then, is merely a label for the subset of information which has passed through the BKM for obtaining reliable, practical information--steps 1-8, namely, information which has been obtained via the scientific method.

while “Good Science” is merely a label for the subset of information which has passed through steps 1-8, while also utilizing the BKM for each step – such as double blind groups, controls, and statistical analysis.

and “Poor Science” is merely a label for the subset of information which has passed through steps 1-8, without utilizing the BKM for each step.

What passes for "science" today is not science at all. Science today emphasizes "peer review" which consists of publishing articles in several journals and counting how many citations they receive. The presentation of experimental results confirming or refuting a hypothesis is only the first step in the #8 Retest, not the last. A lot of modern scientists forget that.

Here is a quote from Courtney et al in a response to "On The Nature of Science"

"At this point, is science really a powerful, objective epistemology for exploring natural law, or have we merely replaced one set of authorities (the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages) with another (the scientists of the 21st century)?

We must not replace experimental repeatability with peer-reviewed observations as the ultimate arbiter of scientific validity. Only repeatable experimental results qualify as scientific observations."

The knowledge of the Middle Age Catholic Church was based on divine revelation, and had no predicative power. It was viewed by the populace as authoritative because of the position of church leaders, and made widespread by their consensus. Likewise, scientists of the 21st century, in my mind, have lost their predictive power. They are no longer practicing science as it was or is intended. There is little emphasis on repeatability--all the emphasis has shifted to peer consensus. The only reason the general public believes the scientific consensus over any other is their position – not the predictive power of their models – and not unlike the Catholic Church of the middle ages.

The emphasis is supposed to be on the repeatability of results by independent experimenters, not peer consensus in "scientific" journals.

>> ^Memorare:
maybe siftbot is operating in some parallel universe where time is sped up.
In these physics videos one thing they never offer an explaination for is why the quantum level events don't scale up and occur on our macro level since everything is made up of sub-atomic particles organized as atoms. As with the Schroedinger's Cat paradox it would be kind of disappointing to finally discover a unified theory of everything, only to learn that it really doesn't matter since it doesn't scale up to mundane reality and therefore only "exists" as a theoretical concept. (personally i think the notion that the cat is both dead AND alive simultaneaously and observation determines which, is a lot of mathematical bs, ie it's not Really true except on paper but then i'm not a cosmologist or metaphysicist so what do i know)
Also, a simpler question that has an answer but i just don't know what it is...
with all the anti-matter positrons bombarding the planet via cosmic rays, don't they ever bang into some electrons and create a tiny but big enough to be measured matter/anti-matter explosion? Sure matter is mostly empty (or not so empty apparently) space and possible collisions are few, but cloud chambers indicate tons of these thigns zipping around so Howcome there's not bazillions of these tiny explosions going off all around us constantly?


Yes, the quantum world really destroyed the normal stance of science. It is when math stole the show and ruined the normal claims that science was used to making about the world. In the now, we are talking about things that exist outside of our ability to experience them. The only things that can experience them are our machines we create to measure them; and they do so in a diminished and programed method (they interpolate data). So we are left to interpret an interpretation of an event. When you start getting that convoluted then you have to make the realization that you are no longer talking about what "is", but what your machine is interpolating (The forms of the universe aren't necessarily discrete or concrete, but it will be changed by the machine so that a result can be given). We have gotten to the point where we are no longer talking about the way things "are" about the universe anymore, just about how our machines experience the different elements of phenomena in the universe (your eyes are just as much a part of this machine analogy as well, but that is a tale for another day).

I think one of the largest criticisms of the relativist camp that really sticks is there is not sufficient reason to accept the quantum model over any other model that explains things. The grounds for saying the things that exist in quantum mathematics don't lie in understanding of those elements but the claim that since the math works, then it must be true. This is putting the cart before the horse and it begs the question "why". Why not any other way that also works? We could refine Newton to incorporate some of the quantum findings and use that as the explanation of everything. There is not sufficient reason to suppose that forces are the real things in the universe, or space time warps, quantum probability matrices.

Most "old" ways of thinking just get abandon for not being popular among the new generation of scientist trying to make a name for themselves. Quine talked about this extensively. Things move in and out of popularity in this realm like any other and scientists are just like MTV peoples and everyone else of jumping on the new trend. Truly, there is not sufficient reason to believe that Aristotelian motion isn't the real method of locomotion in the universe.

Simply put, new science don't care about whys anymore. New science is about making models of massive amounts of data. It won't ever be able to give a reason if something violates that model, it just has to re-engineer the model to incorporate the new data set. It lacks any truth to it because it is always in need of more data to continue to refine its model. It will never know when the model is complete or 100% accurate. It is actually the end road of the epistemology of empirical materialism. A constantly evolving model of data is the best "truth" you can hope from science. It will never have a why, that simply isn't a role of science. It is because "it is" and that is all they will ever be able to say; now more than ever.


edit (several times for grammar, man I sux at expressing myself)

>> ^westy:
.lol what a retard he is now a christain lol so stupid moving from one thing bassed on no evidence to another thing thats bassed on no evidence what a fuckwit


And you have some epistemological view that is supported by pure logic and no assumption? Kant's Critique of Pure Reason pointed out the limitations of the empirical explanations of science, and Quine's Rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction destroyed logical positivism.

So far any philosophic or religious understanding lacks exhaustive explanation of everything. Every mode of truth has been struck down as incomplete or lacking in the necessity for it to make the claim that it is objective in nature. Surely the person in the video isn't a fuckwit.

Edit: Removing what could be interpreted as a slam. Thanks bluecliff

God doesn't agree. Or at least God decided to take him up to heaven early.

Anyone read this total bullsh-t challenge? What kind of coward makes these bold claims of reward to anyone who can answer the questions and then does this:

This is a rough draft. The Challenge will be formally available to everyone the same day i53 releases the first installment of its new reality series "The Great Commission."

Ok, so your contest will never be "official".. bravo.

1. To receive the $5,300, you must answer the question(s) without contradicting yourself.

define "contradict".

6. All responses cost $1.00. This cost is not to generate revenue but rather to curb excessive and superfluous responses.

Ok, nice challenge. Surely they will receive thousands of entries to their bullsh-t challenge. So they aren't even putting up their own money. BUt I agree it is helpful to limit entries especially if people have to read them.

11. Only one $5,300 prize will be allotted. This prize will go to the first individual who can answer the question(s) below without contradicting him or herself.

Ok, again is it first one submitted? First one submitted after the contest becomes "official". What lying cowards.

8. At the top of your response, please state your ultimate epistemological authority... You must be extremely specific when stating your ultimate epistemological authority. That is, you will need to explicitly tell us the one religious text or the one living person that you consider to be ultimately authoritative.

How is this a challenge to atheists or agnostics??? Also, the rules state:

If in your submission, you give ultimate authority to any other living person other than yourself, your submission will be automatically invalidated, and you will lose your $1.00.

So by definition of the contest you must state the ONE religious text you follow. What kind of morons are these? Note that the "Bible" is not in fact one religious text even.

Now the questions immediately invalidate the contest because you cannot answer them all by definition without contradiction. They only apply to different belief systems.

Question 1 & 2
These two questions are for the atheist, postmodernist, or any individual who thinks that man constructs his truth rather than discovers a transcendent truth outside of himself.

Question 3
This next question is for the agnostic, for anyone who does not hold to a formal system of thought, for anyone who holds himself to be ultimately authoritative, or for any non-Christian who believes that truth is discovered rather than constructed ... Please note that this question pertains to all individuals who believe in a god, but their belief stems from their own mind, rather than from some divinely revealed text.

Question 4
This question is for the Hindu, the Buddhist, or any adherent of an (eastern) religion that denies the existence of propositional truth on an ultimate level.

Question 5
This next question is for any adherent of Islam, Roman Catholicism, Judaism, Mormonism, Jehovah Witness, or any monotheistic religion which possesses an authoritative text (or revelation) that claims its (infinite) God has characteristics of justice and mercy.


This is the biggest joke and exercise in mental masturbation. By the contest's own rules even the Christian author of the challenge has failed and cannot collect the money. I'm glad God decided to smote this charlatan