It is better form to just put part 2 in the same sift as part 1 or sift them separately?

Once again QualiaSoup delivers a *quality take-down of *religious sophistry.

Boosting this quality contribution up in the Hot Listing - declared quality by hpqp.

Adding video to channels (Religion) - requested by hpqp.

Well... not really.

First off, this isn't a specifically religious line of argument. Sure, the philosophers that he's quoting are indeed well known Christian philosophers. But one doesn't need to be Christian, or to be religious, or even broadly theistic in order to recognize the strength of some arguments for dualism.

So let's start with QualiaSoup's repeated comments about what would constitute a coherent account of dualism. His constant question is what an account of dualism would even look like without a physical account. For example, "How would an agent with no physical manifestation differ from no agent at all?"But this borders on circularity--if the only kind of coherent account that exists is a physical account, then there clearly cannot be a coherent account of dualism. Which is to say that QualiaSoup appears to be rejecting dualist accounts because they are dualist. Which is circular reasoning. If QualiaSoup wishes to advance such an objection, then it demonstrates nothing but the state of his beliefs about dualism, and says nothing about the truth or falsehood of the substance dualist theory of mind.


Moreover, he consistently conflates consciousness with cognition. Cognition pertains to the processing of data. An entity that is not conscious could certainly go through processes we would recognize as cognitive. Consciousness pertains to the awareness or the internal experience of, among other things, the objects of cognition. Even if cognition were largely handled by a physical brain, one could still assert a non-physical consciousness without any contradictions.

QualiaSoup does not seem to realize that substance dualism all but requires that damage to the brain result in bizarre functioning. One of the most consistent elements of dualist theories since the 17th century has been an understanding that the mind and the brain have causal relationships with each other. Pointing out the bizarre effects of brain damage on mental functioning no more disproves dualism than pointing out that drinking too much alcohol gets you drunk--the dualist already understands that these kinds of relationships must hold, and there are already the broad outlines of an account in place in dualism.

In his discussions of Swinburne's modal argument for dualism, QualiaSoup fundamentally misunderstands possibility and "apparent conceivability." Let's quote from the revised edition of Swinburne's Evolution of the Soul:

"The only arguments which can be given to show some supposition to be logically possible are arguments which spell it out, which tell in detail a story of what it would be like for it to be true and do not seem to involve any contradictions, i.e. arguments from apparent conceivability. Apparent conceivability
is evidence (though not of course conclusive evidence) of logical possibility." (pp. 324-325)

QualiaSoup's objection is clearly a straw-man argument when you look at the full passage. The counter-example of the time-traveler fails the "apparent conceivability" test immediately because it involves an obvious contradiction. Which is to say that, by Swinburne's definition, QS's example is NOT apparently conceivable. Moreover, QualiaSoup clearly misunderstands the notion of "logical possibility." A statement can be logically possible without being physically possible. It is logically possible that the moon is made out of cheese--there are no logical contradictions that would follow--despite its being a physical impossibility. Swinburne's argument has nothing to do with physical possibility--only logical possibility.

tl;dr
QualiaSoup needs to take some more philosophy classes. Philosophy is totally badass.

>> ^hpqp:

Once again QualiaSoup delivers a quality take-down of religious sophistry.

@HadouKen24

Thanks for the insight. I'd never heard of substance dualism before watching these videos, and didn't know the arguments on either side.

The places you find issues with QS are in his take-downs of others' arguments/his own straw men, and not with arguments against SD itself. So I'd like to go back to QS's earliest statements about requirements for proponents of SD: If they propose there's a special substance, then they must show evidence of its existence, must say what property allows it to think while normal substance can't, and must show that it possesses that property, OR they must explain how a non-physical substance can be said to think or do, or even exist, and what would anchor that substance so firmly inside a particular real physical body. I think those are fair demands. Does philosophy have anything to answer them?