Well... not really.

First off, this isn't a specifically religious line of argument. Sure, the philosophers that he's quoting are indeed well known Christian philosophers. But one doesn't need to be Christian, or to be religious, or even broadly theistic in order to recognize the strength of some arguments for dualism.

So let's start with QualiaSoup's repeated comments about what would constitute a coherent account of dualism. His constant question is what an account of dualism would even look like without a physical account. For example, "How would an agent with no physical manifestation differ from no agent at all?"But this borders on circularity--if the only kind of coherent account that exists is a physical account, then there clearly cannot be a coherent account of dualism. Which is to say that QualiaSoup appears to be rejecting dualist accounts because they are dualist. Which is circular reasoning. If QualiaSoup wishes to advance such an objection, then it demonstrates nothing but the state of his beliefs about dualism, and says nothing about the truth or falsehood of the substance dualist theory of mind.


Moreover, he consistently conflates consciousness with cognition. Cognition pertains to the processing of data. An entity that is not conscious could certainly go through processes we would recognize as cognitive. Consciousness pertains to the awareness or the internal experience of, among other things, the objects of cognition. Even if cognition were largely handled by a physical brain, one could still assert a non-physical consciousness without any contradictions.

QualiaSoup does not seem to realize that substance dualism all but requires that damage to the brain result in bizarre functioning. One of the most consistent elements of dualist theories since the 17th century has been an understanding that the mind and the brain have causal relationships with each other. Pointing out the bizarre effects of brain damage on mental functioning no more disproves dualism than pointing out that drinking too much alcohol gets you drunk--the dualist already understands that these kinds of relationships must hold, and there are already the broad outlines of an account in place in dualism.

In his discussions of Swinburne's modal argument for dualism, QualiaSoup fundamentally misunderstands possibility and "apparent conceivability." Let's quote from the revised edition of Swinburne's Evolution of the Soul:

"The only arguments which can be given to show some supposition to be logically possible are arguments which spell it out, which tell in detail a story of what it would be like for it to be true and do not seem to involve any contradictions, i.e. arguments from apparent conceivability. Apparent conceivability
is evidence (though not of course conclusive evidence) of logical possibility." (pp. 324-325)

QualiaSoup's objection is clearly a straw-man argument when you look at the full passage. The counter-example of the time-traveler fails the "apparent conceivability" test immediately because it involves an obvious contradiction. Which is to say that, by Swinburne's definition, QS's example is NOT apparently conceivable. Moreover, QualiaSoup clearly misunderstands the notion of "logical possibility." A statement can be logically possible without being physically possible. It is logically possible that the moon is made out of cheese--there are no logical contradictions that would follow--despite its being a physical impossibility. Swinburne's argument has nothing to do with physical possibility--only logical possibility.

tl;dr
QualiaSoup needs to take some more philosophy classes. Philosophy is totally badass.

>> ^hpqp:

Once again QualiaSoup delivers a quality take-down of religious sophistry.

It's only fallacious if I'm actually making an argument, which I wasn't. Just personal comments on the man's work.

I didn't go into specifics simply because of time, but if you like, I can give you a brief rundown of what I find objectionable about his work.

The KCA: Craig seems to think that the Kalam Cosmological Argument is a very strong argument for theism, but it has numerous weaknesses. Craig argues for the impossibility of an actual infinite, whether in terms of a series in time, or of an infinitude of physical objects. His arguments in this regard are spectacularly weak. He believes, for instance, that the Hilbert's Hotel paradox shows that an actual infinite is absurd. This is not what the paradox shows, however--it only shows that an actual infinite would behave in unintuitive ways, breaking apart properties of numbers that we normally find together. Moreover, Craig provides no good reason to think that the first cause would have to be personal. He assumes that only a person could cause something to come from nothing, but doesn't back this up with any sound arguments.

Religious Epistemology: Craig asserts that philosophical arguments are neither necessary nor sufficient to have justified belief and genuine knowledge of the truth of Christianity--the light of the Holy Spirit is enough. He says this of himself as well, and is thus committed to his belief in Christianity regardless of any arguments that might be presented. He thus declares himself impervious to any argument that might vitiate Christianity--this is a profound philosophical failing. To declare that no conceivable argument can convince you away from your position is to declare the entire philosophical enterprise almost entirely purposeless with regard to that question.

The Resurrection: Craig uses Bayesian probability theory to argue for the likelihood of the resurrection, claiming that when the calculation of prior probability includes a belief in the existence of God, then the resurrection will be probable--and thus, the rejection of the resurrection by atheists just comes down to a dogmatic rejection based on a previously held belief. Craig is not the first to make this argument; Richard Swinburne first advanced it in the 70's. It is, however, a very bad argument. It only works if the "God" in question is in particular a Christian God to begin with. Not just any God will do, or the resurrection of Jesus is hardly more likely than the epiphany of Krishna or the revelations to Mohammad. But the specifically Christian notion of God was developed only out of belief in the resurrection in the first place. Thus, Craig's argument is largely circular.

>> ^gwaan:

The famous Oxford philosopher of religion - Richard Swinburne - employed the principal of Occam's razor to argue that God is the simplest explanation for the existence of the universe - far simpler than any explanation offered by science.

Swinburne can only argue Occam's razor by assuming, without basis, that "God did it" falls under "all things being equal" clause, but it is not at all evident that that is the case, if somebody wants to posit HOW "God did it", then we could apply Occam's razor.

>> ^ant:
What's "James Joyce Award"?


From the college website:

"Previous recipients of the James Joyce Award include: former UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix; author, Bill Bryson; philosopher, Professor Richard Swinburne and actor, Ralph Fiennes. Over the years, every Taoiseach and President has addressed the society.

“Mr Ferrell receives the James Joyce Award for his tremendous contribution to the field of comedy entertainment, as a comedian, writer and actor,” said Michael McGrath, Auditor, 153rd Session, Literary and Historical Society, UCD.

Hollywood actor Will Ferrell recieving the James Joyce Award from Michael McGrath, Auditor, 153rd Session, Literary and Historical Society."


Which doesn't clear up what the award is for exactly, but possibly they just give it to someone they like.

Occam's Razor: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem - entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. This is often paraphrased as "All things being equal, the simplest solution tends to be the best one."

The famous Oxford philosopher of religion - Richard Swinburne - employed the principal of Occam's razor to argue that God is the simplest explanation for the existence of the universe - far simpler than any explanation offered by science.

Ray Comfort v. "Kelly" moderated by the lovely Martin Bashir - A clash of intellectual titans to be sure. . .

Why doesn't Nightline, which was at one point in its history a serious television show, get Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Franklin Graham, Richard Swinburne, or Elaine Pagels and have an actual debate?

Oh wait . . .it is a Martin Bashir special . . .how about R. Kelly, OJ Simpson, and Michael Jackson then?

sigh . . .this whole thing gives belief (either in rationalism or in magic) a bad name. Downvote for the poor vid quality and the disgusting fall of Nightline.

jlee:

You should actually submit the Polkinghorne and see where it goes. I am still looking (in vain) for some Swinburne to post.

And thus we are back to the last paragraph of my post farther up on the page. Money creates product which creates further ideas/ideals which creates more money. And then people fight.

It is very easy to view the pursuit of science as something pure and exceptional, but in the end, it is still a product of confused but well-meaning bipeds (FN: paraphrasing some nice bits by choggie). I prefer to view it about as skeptically as I view Jesus. But not nearly as skeptically as I view Benny Hinn.

Rational people who are also religious: Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, E.P. Sanders, Elaine Pagels,James Carroll, et al.

I will try to find some Swinburne for the Sift. YouTube may or may not have him, but he is just great.

If you are looking for a serious opposite view dag, try reading Richard Swinburne and the ones mentioned in jlee22's post.

LadyBug: It may be helpful to clarify what we mean by "irrational". Strictly speaking, to be irrational would be to hold a set of a logically inconsistent beliefs. For example, believing that God both exists and does not exist would be irrational. However, it seems that what you mean by "irrational" is to hold a belief without having any good reason to support that belief.

I would agree that it is not very rational to hold a belief simply because your parents, or society large holds it, but I think it would be unfair to assume that most, if not all of the adult religious population hold their beliefs simply because their parents do. This seems to be what you're suggesting in your comment above.

There are many independent thinking individuals who have good reasons for their religious adherence. Disagreement with said reasons does not necessarily mean that any one particular party is irrational. Professional philosophers disagree over numerous issues, but no one would say that anyone from opposing sides is irrational.

For examples of rational people who are religious, see Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, William Alston, et al.