>> ^Almanildo:

Postulating a new kind of physical interaction isn't substance dualism; you have to take the new stuff completely out of physics to call it dualist.

On the subject of determinism, we don't really know whether physics is deterministic. My belief is that it's not. However, it's not a given that determinism is even relevant for the problem of free will. Daniel Dennett argues (quite convincingly in my book) that it's not.


I don't see the point to that definition of substance dualism. How much farther removed from "physical" can you get than existing in a separate, invisible dimension? All the statements substance dualism makes about consciousness can still be true in a scenario where consciousness is part of an extra-physical dimension.

I watched Dennett's talk, the salient point comes at the conclusion which is "free will exists in the sense that matters," which is to say "real" free will doesn't exist, and that the universe is still ultimately deterministic in his view.

I think it's fairly obvious that quantum indeterminacy is generally incapable of showing that we have something like free will. There are arguments which may show that, under certain conditions, quantum indeterminacy is quite capable of generating something more or less like free will. Roger Penrose (the brilliant mathematician, physicist, and philosopher who co-formulated the Penrose-Hawking theorems) advanced such an argument, attempting in Shadows of the Mind to show quantum effects in microtubules of the brain are responsible for both consciousness and free will. However, further research into the physics of the brain showed this line of reasoning to be ultimately defunct.

>> ^Almanildo:
>>
However, it's not a given that determinism is even relevant for the problem of free will. Daniel Dennett argues (quite convincingly in my book) that it's not.

>> ^Lodurr:

That's the point, that today's "non-physical" is tomorrow's "physical." Dualists argue that consciousness results from physical interactions that we can't presently perceive, and that these interactions aren't limited to our perceivable dimensions.
@Almanildo, the problem with classical physics-based consciousness is that physics is deterministic, and our experience of consciousness is non-deterministic. We've recently gone from thinking that we were completely free-willed to a more complex understanding of brain chemistry and motor functions, but the basic experience of awareness and self-guided thought seem fundamentally impossible to pin as deterministic.

Postulating a new kind of physical interaction isn't substance dualism; you have to take the new stuff completely out of physics to call it dualist.


On the subject of determinism, we don't really know whether physics is deterministic. My belief is that it's not. However, it's not a given that determinism is even relevant for the problem of free will. Daniel Dennett argues (quite convincingly in my book) that it's not.

I am very tired, so this post may be extremely error-ridden.

Notes as I proceed through the video:

Uh-oh. QualiaSoup's first point seems quite wrong-headed. He claims that "non-physical substance" illegitimately smuggles in the physical concept of "substance." But here I think he's problematically confusing our everyday colloquial use of the word "substance" with the philosophical meaning(s). To speak of a substance in philosophical jargon is merely to say that the "substance" is that which underlies all other properties of a thing and make it what it is. Thus, Spinoza was able to say that there is only one substance, underlying all materiality but not itself material. Leibniz made a somewhat similar claim, but allowed for the existence of an infinite number of substances called monads.

Second, even if it's true that speaking of a "non-physical substance" requires an analogy from physical substance, it's not at all obvious that this is problematic. Insofar as the non-physical shares some subset of properties with the physical, or has similar but somewhat different properties, one may legitimately borrow physical language to speak of it. The substance dualist might easily accept that there is some shared subset of properties.

Next, QS claims that substance dualists often conflate mind, soul, and consciousness without substantiating argument. This is either a straw man or an attack on the very weakest defenders of substance dualism. Waste of time making this point.

Next, QS offers an apparently coherent account of the public and private access of "physical" and "mental" events respectively, as against the dualist argument that such an account seems impossible. However, it is not at all obvious that he genuinely succeeds. A robust dualist argument would proceed under the assumption that the contents of the mind can be inferred perfectly from the contents of the brain (this is acceptable even under substance dualism). Even under such conditions, it is not obvious that the processes so identified are identical to my conscious experience. It has been argued even by atheist physicalists like Thomas Nagel that there is something in subjective experience uncaptured by physical accounts. As Nagel says in his most famous essay, even the most robust physical theory seems incapable of telling us what it would be like to be a bat. A dualist account might provide us with a coherent way to deal with this problem in a way that physicalism is incapable of.

Next, some nonsense about split brains. Yawn. No ground is going to be gained or lost for dualism on these grounds; the most QS can show is that a monist account is equally capable of accounting for such phenomena. I suppose he's correct that this can't be used as a good argument against

Next, a discussion of replacement of all one's cells every seven years. Not only is it not the case that this happens, but this would be a particularly bad argument for dualism. Is QS just going after the easy objections to his position and leaving alone the strong ones?

Next, damage to the body causing changes and/or damage in mental functioning. So what? Under substance dualism, there must be reciprocal causal relationships between the brain and the mind. This kind of thing is just what one expects under substance dualism.



This may be QS's most poorly argued video. At the most compelling point in the video, QS offers an apparently coherent account of private and public access which, if the dualist position is correct, should not be at all likely, if even possible. And, to be sure, there are philosophers of mind who will agree with him, such as Daniel Dennett. Yet there are just as many who will not, including very prominent philosophers like David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel. At every other point, he is either wrong or irrelevant.

Thanks man.

In reply to this comment by geo321:
*quality

Tags for this video have been changed from 'daniel dennett, richard dawkins, philosopher' to 'daniel dennett, richard dawkins, philosopher, Deepity, Deepities' - edited by schmawy

>> ^rottenseed:
If you can't quite grasp the idea that gravity doesn't "overcome it", rather, it's a force that's constantly being applied to the object, then maybe you shouldn't be blowing shit up...


>> ^rottenseed:
>> ^gwiz665:
He reminds me of Daniel Dennett.
Well, rottenseed, it's not really wrong. The force of gravity is constant and when that force influences the anvil more than the force from the explosion ("overcomes" it) it goes in the direction of gravity.

physics fail. PM myself or mycroft for further explanation.


1. People been blowing shit up with gunpowder for millenia before the concepts of force and gravity were formalised. Doesn't mean it can't still be safe, and this guy seems to have had a lot of practice.

2. Don't judge his intelligence based on one utterance. Perhaps this dude has a PhD in physics for all you know...

3. Jesus H. Christ go toke a bong already!!

>> ^gwiz665:
He reminds me of Daniel Dennett.
Well, rottenseed, it's not really wrong. The force of gravity is constant and when that force influences the anvil more than the force from the explosion ("overcomes" it) it goes in the direction of gravity.

physics *fail. PM myself or mycroft for further explanation.

He reminds me of Daniel Dennett.

Well, rottenseed, it's not really wrong. The force of gravity is constant and when that force influences the anvil more than the force from the explosion ("overcomes" it) it goes in the direction of gravity.

Oh man, you make a good argument here GSF, but some of your points are wonderfully put down by Daniel Dennett (my hero) in, hmm, I think it was Consciousness Explained. (I wrote an assignment on this a few years back, I'll just see if I can get the quotes and stuff..)

The Chinese Room thought experiment is essentially a dud. Dennett calls it an Intuition Pump.

“while philosophers and others have always found flaws in his thought experiment when it is considered as a logical argument, it is undeniable that its “conclusion” continues to seem “obvious” to many people. Why? Because people don’t actually imagine the case in the detail it requires.”

He argues that Searle's position may:

“(…) lull us into the (unwarranted) supposition that the giant program would work by somehow simply “matching up” the input Chinese characters with some output Chinese characters. No such program would work, of course”

For a program to work it would have to be:
“extraordinarily supple, sophisticated, and multilayered system, brimming with “world knowledge” and meta-knowledge and meta-meta-knowledge about its own responses, the likely responses of its interlocutor, its own “motivations” and the motivations of the interlocutor, and much, much more”

The point is, that Searle only looks at the man in the box, and not the whole box, which is what answers. While the little man may not have an understanding of the Chinese letters, the man + the reference book does have that understanding. Searle himself argues that this box would pass a Turing test, but that's the whole box, not just the little man inside.

You say

"Let us use another example. Let us say that we have broadcasting towers all over the USA. They are broadcasting all sorts of different programs to all sorts of different people. It is a complex web of towers and receivers but it all seems to work out ok. So, are we to conclude that radio towers are conscious? Of course not, but that is what are are doing with the human experience of consciousness. Lets look at that quickly.

When you experience something, you experience every one of your scenes simultaneously. You remember the sounds, the tastes, the sights...it is all there. However, your brain never really has a point in which all points connect. Your consciousness is something that seems to violate the laws of physics, that things are happening in different locations in space at different times, but for your consciousness, at the same time. This isn't something that is reducible to brain states, and not something that is physically possible in computer technology as we know it. It doesn't matter if it is parallel or not, if things don't touch but are somehow related this is mystifying; and as a result, unreproducible. Perhaps consciousnesses is reducible to one point in the brain we haven't found, but so far, there is no such thing."

And again, I want to refer to Dennett and his "Multiple Drafts theory", which I think is an excellent answer to this. I don't think that consciousness violates physics as such (obviously it doesn't, or it couldn't exist in our physical universe). I think that our consciousness is an amalgamation of sensory input that is processed in our brain and presented in our consciousness as "scenes". I mean, we have a much, much larger flow of sensory input than is presented to us, and our unconscious mind filters though this and presents what is perceived to be relevant inputs to "us" (our conscious minds). I think in the end it is actually reducible to brain states, in the same way that any give program, say firefox with videosift loaded, can be reduced to an electrical state at a given time in my computer.

On the concept on Blue and blueness, I think you are making a Qualia argument. To be honest, I can't remember all the details of that right now, but again Dennet's "Quining Qualia" in one of his books covers it greatly, if my memory serves.

I also love this subject.

Bmacs27: I'll get back to you when I'm not as drunk as now, but for now I recommend Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained.

It's sitting on the bookshelf in the conference room my journal club meets in. It caught my eye a couple times. I'll pick it up.

@ ghandi...

I'm going to plead the gwizz here. Let me sober up, and I'll get back to you. I know the gist of my argument will be something like, why should I assume a maximum entropy bound for conscious experience? Are individuals with downs' syndrome conscious? How about amoebas that can solve mazes?[citation]

>> ^Jesus_Freak:
^JoeDirt
Your arguments were impressive, but fell well short of what I was hoping for.
First: Your main answer to my "gotcha" question was that we don't know and what I'm looking for is probably unknowable. I appreciate the primer on current scientific theory, but I was indulging in skipping to the end. I'm sure there will be mind blowing theories and constructs out there before I die, but I guarantee you NONE will be able to explain what "force" brought the earliest point of origin into being. The whole "we're experiencing an infinite repetitive loop" doesn't get you there. Something had to make this little sandbox our universe is spinning in.
Second: You did manage to provide me one answer I was looking for. By your own words, there is a lot we don't know on the basis of science alone, and what we do know is subject to revision and update. Given that, I don't see how any legitimate self-respecting scientist could adamantly conclude that there is no God. Where is the concrete evidence for that conclusion? In this day and age, I see SCIENCE = RELIGION in its own right. I've encountered religious nuts in your corner way further out on a limb than I am with my dusty old Bible.

Evidence based conclusions. As long as no one can conclude that there is a god, the evidence shows that there is no god.

To everyone else. Can you honestly take in the astounding sights, sounds, and wonders of the world around us and not at least consider the possibility that this was not all the result of ridiculously improbable chaos? The order and certainty, which I thank Science for demonstrating, in the laws of physics and gravity...you can honestly say "gee, neat that it all just came together like that?" Our planet alone would have had to have been to result of 10,000,000 lottery odds occurrences all happening in concert. Nothing was behind that?
You science guys have far more faith than I!


That's just a damn lie. Scientists have NO FAITH. Chances have nothing to do with how the universe is put together. If I roll a million dice in a row, I will get a certain order of 1-6; what are the chances of getting exactly that result? 1.000.000^6 (or is it 6^1.000.000?) in any case, astronomical, but nonetheless I got the result I did. You cannot retroactively apply a theoretical chance. The chance that I did get what I did is 100% because I did get it.

It came together the way it did, because it did. Anthropic principle covers it.

Bmacs27: I'll get back to you when I'm not as drunk as now, but for now I recommend Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained.

1. What is your idea of perfect happiness?
Being in love.
2. What is your greatest fear?
Dying (not death, because by then I'll be dead).
3. What is the trait you most deplore in yourself?
Jealousy.
4. What is the trait you most deplore in others?
Dishonesty or abuse.
5. Which living person do you most admire?
Daniel Dennett
6. What is your greatest extravagance?
I don't think I really have any great extravagance. Maybe my computer?
7. What is your current state of mind?
Relaxed and thoughtful.
8. What do you consider the most overrated virtue?
Altruism and faith.
9. On what occasion do you lie?
Rarely, but if my lie can save a lot of grief, by avoiding an unnecessary confrontation about something stupid, I might.
10. What do you most dislike about your appearance?
My gut.
11. Which living person do you most despise?
Hmm, so hard to choose: Kent Hovind, Kenn Hamm (all those creationist dumbfucks), and televangelists. And Rasch187.
12. What is the quality you most like in a man?
Honesty, humor, friendship, intellect.
13. What is the quality you most like in a woman?
Awesome beewbage. Heh. Nah, humor, honesty, straight-forwardness, intellect, friendship.. I look for the same qualities in both guys and girls, to be honest.
14. Which words or phrases do you most overuse?
"Fantastic", "super", "In a minute"
15. What or who is the greatest love of your life?
For now, music.
16. When and where were you happiest?
I don't know. Maybe when I was in Ireland in 2002 and was entangled with a girl from my high school, or one summer in 2003 I think, where we were a bunch of people in a summer house where I played guitar and we all sang and stuff. I liked that.
17. Which talent would you most like to have?
Better song-writing skills.
18. If you could change one thing about yourself, what would it be?
Physically, I'd trim up. (Already on it)
More cosmically, I'd like to be able to have a better overview of a situation during, instead of after it happens.
19. What do you consider your greatest achievement?
My education, my music skills and the website I ran in 2004-2007, which I was very prolific on. (www.edb-tidende.dk it's dead in the water now though)
20. If you were to die and come back as a person or a thing, what would it be?
I would come back as a young version of myself and try to change things up, see what would happen if I made different choices.
21. Where would you most like to live?
With a loved one. Don't really care where.
22. What is your most treasured possession?
My mind. Of things outside myself, then I think the things I can't replace. The data on my computer, pictures, documents etc. I think. All other "possessions" can be replaced. They're just things. I would say friendships, but that's hardly a possession.
23. What do you regard as the lowest depth of misery?
Depression, then everything sucks. Been there, no fun.
24. What is your favorite occupation?
Playing music, engaging in reasonable discussions, masturbation. (at the same time)
25. What is your most marked characteristic?
I say my mind. I'm a pretty straight-forward, no-nonsense kinda guy. Other than that, I don't know. Other people are better judges of that than me.
26. What do you most value in your friends?
Honesty and humor.
27. Who are your favorite writers?
Frank Herbert, Neal Stephenson, William King, Scott McGough.
28. Who is your hero of fiction?
Randy Marsh. Heh, or Rorsharch and Dr. Manhattan. Randy epitomizes the human condition, weak, narrow sighted and everything. Rosharch represents a view of the world in black and white, which I like the concept of; and Dr. Manhattan represents the way the world is and he is basically intellect personified, which I also like.
29. Which historical figure do you most identify with?
This requires me to know a lot of history. I don't, because I don't care much about it. I identify with me, because I am me, no one else.
30. Who are your heroes in real life?
The four horsemen, Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens.
31. What are your favorite names?
Lisa, Cecilia, Michael, Jason, off the top of my head.
32. What is it that you most dislike?
People lying to me or in general who are dicks to me. I have no interest in these people.
33. What is your greatest regret?
Two things, I think. Not doing anything about the girl I had a serious crush on for most of my elementary school until high school; and not realizing that Computer Science was not for me earlier, instead of fucking around there for two years.
34. How would you like to die?
I'd rather not.
35. What is your motto?
"Don't be a dick" is something I can stand by.

Given the religiously themed title of this post, I have to say, hooray for humanism, and our ability to forgive and treat one another with compassion. and point out that this is NOT something we get from religion, but something religion steals from us. Had this nice man been a believing Christian, for example, he would probably attribute, wrongly, his act of kindness as something he picked up from the emphasis on forgiveness in the new testament. But even though Islamic scripture, to my knowledge, does not emphasize the "turn the other cheek" mentality like Jesus occasionally did, it is pretty safe to assume that this noble behavior by this man was not, as the robberer assumed, because he was religious, but rather despite it.

Steven Weinberg once said: With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil — that takes religion.

With this video, and perhaps Daniel Dennetts excellent near-death article in mind, one could perhaps reverse the slogan, and simply say "With or without religion, for people to do good things - that takes Goodness."

>> ^gwiz665:
"There's nothing I like less than bad arguments for a view that I hold dear."
- Daniel Dennett.

Nietzsche wrote something similar in "Die fröhliche Wissenschaft" (Gay Science):

"The most perfidious way of harming a cause consists of defending it deliberately with faulty arguments."


And since most of the comments before me were written on a computer, I feel obliged to add a quote of Alan Turing:

"We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done."