Ah, I've run into these guys before. They do good work in general, although from time to time they can be a tiny bit misguided.

A few corrections to some statements he made:
On viral hemorrhagic fevers: "If you get it, you're pretty much gonna die" - no, although they're dangerous on the individual level, the real danger lies in their capability to be transmitted from human to human quickly and easily. Survival rates vary widely amongst the different families of VHFs, amongst different viruses, and amongst different strains.
On BSL-4 labs: "There are only five in the US" - no, to public knowledge there were seven fully-capable BSL-4s in the US at the time of his speech.
On preparation: "Red teams raise treaty issues" - wut. Treaty issues? On our own territory?

His overall analysis of budgeting for infectious diseases in terms of biowarfare/bioterrorism is pretty spot-on, allocation isn't based on demonstrated current need, and very often it should be, rather than fear, political influence, and public desire (anthrax springs to mind). The argument against that, however, is the fact that demonstrated current need is not all that needs to be considered. Avian flu, for example, demonstrates little current need in terms of infections and deaths per year, but the potential for both is staggering. Also, considering the US's policy of "homeland defense" above international wellbeing, it is no surprise that the military budgets its bio research money towards biowarfare and countering such and related topics. I think the overall call should instead focus on NIH, NIS and other federal grant-giving organizations moving away from these research topics, where the most good can be accomplished.

thanks for your input rembar and the upvote.

*requeue

Re-queueing this video for one more try; last queued Sunday, January 27th, 2008 7:26am PST - requeue requested by submitter sorted.