@oritteropo

There is a long history of Latin American currency crises which I would refer you to as examples of disorderly collapse. That Tsipras would break most of his electoral promises in his recent 4 month extension agreement should tell you that he knows how catastrophic it would be. You can't quantitatively approximate these kinds of events but qualitatively* (TYPO) the following is likely to occur:

1) Bank run - You saw significant withdrawals even leading up to the meeting with the Troika because of the possibility funding will abruptly stop. A stop to euro lending will see mass outflows with the expectation of bank collapse which will itself likely lead to the collapse of multiple banking institutions.

2) Foreign flows of currencies will dry up - Greek bond yields will spike, in effect no one will lend to the Greek government from overseas. Since like any economy, Greece needs to pay its public sector workers and requires foreign capital for imports, to preserve what it has, it will rapidly convert back to using the Drachma which it can issue and print/create. It is likely the banks will follow in turn and convert deposits to Drachma (another reason why people will withdraw money from banks as soon as they think euro support is over).

3) Drachma collapse - The Drachma will then depreciate rapidly. Again, the expectation of depreciation pretty much causes the depreciation. If people expect their currency to be worth less in the future, they will sell it, causing it to be worth less. Any existing savings accounts remaining will be decimated in value. Wages will fall drastically for everyone. Suddenly the cost of anything that relies on imported products (hint, a lot in any economy, especially Greece) will rise several-fold. This will lead to further job cuts, collapse of industries, which will precipitate further job loss, unemployment, output loss etc etc etc.

The tl;dr version of this is that government funding crises whether caused by debt or currency collapse in the first instance are self reinforcing and the consequences of an unmanaged collapse are all but guaranteed to be much worse than austerity but order. There is some evidence that countries who have a massive collapse and see their currency depreciate are then about to recover faster afterwards (a cheap currency boost exports, tourism etc) but the human toll is much more sudden and much more severe.

As far as IMF estimates being unrealistic, sure. All I'm arguing about is what is likely to happen and which outcome Greeks should prefer.

Sure Syriza has talked about the good kind of reform, but he's also promised the rest of what I talked about. None of which the Troika will let him do if he wants retain their funding. Anyone following this should have known he would not be allowed any of these promises he made in his election. Surely Tsipras himself knew this. It was either posturing/bluster or pure politics. Now the stability of his government is going to depend on how he can manage down his unrealistic expectations.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/28/alexis-tsipras-athens-lightning-speed-anti-austerity-policies

@oritteropo

There are analyses floating around by just about every major player. A majority seems to agree that it would be manageable for the Eurozone and better for Greece. Others, including Varoufakis, argue that Grexit would destablize the Eurozone and be a catastrophe for Greece. Too many variables, too many vested interests... who knows what would happen.

The projections on the other hand were a hoot. What a joke they were.

What was the fiscal multiplier in their initial projections? Something along the lines of 0.75, right? Reduce public spending by a Euro and the economy contracts by just 75 cents. Too bad it turned out to be at least 2.5, probably even far more during certain phases. Ricardian equivalence, my ass.

Here is the IMF outlook of 2010. Bill Mitchell made a nice table for comparison. They did a crackerjack job, didn't they.

IMF research admitted their mistake in 2012, but the policy department doesn't seem to care. Shouldn't come as a suprise to anyone, given the role the IMF played in the application of the shock doctrine all over the world in the last decades. Chicago School of Economics, all the way.

If I look at the list of countries that were ruined by the IMF through policy advisory and loans with strings attached, I wonder just how they still manage to paint Syriza as the ones lacking credibility. Is it because they lack the experience of destroying an economy?

Yet with all that in mind, the Greeks actually prefer the IMF as a partner if the alternative is German officials. How depressing for me as a German.

Remember what Christine Lagarde said about Greece in 2012? The Grauniad still has the goods. Or how she argued for expansionary austerity in 2010? Krugman, to his credit, made fun of the concept back then, but even he severly underestimated just how willing these people are to turn this stuff into policy.

But still preferrable to German officials. Ouch.

It's a bit hard to say whether the fabled Grexit would have been more damaging than The Austerity, has anyone actually done the calculations?

What we can see, fairly clearly, is that the projected outcome of The Austerity by the Austerity freaks has been completely the opposite of what actually happened. Somewhere there was a nice graph showing projected growth vs actual, but the summary is that where they projected growth in year 4, in actual fact the Greek economy actually just kept contracting. (@radx, did you see the graph?)

The reports I saw of the reform proposals were exactly what you suggest, a credible plan to tackle corruption and to use some of the savings to fund social programs and tackle the humanitarian crisis caused by The Austerity. The Grauniad summarised reactions to the proposal as a sensible compromise between the Greek government’s promises and the demands of its creditors.

You are absolutely right, the results of elections in Greece do not create an obligation for fiscal transfers from other European countries.

But that plays right into what Varoufakis has been saying for years, doesn't it? The program over the last seven years has reduced Greek output by a quarter, and thereby its ability to service and reduce its debt. The troika is offering more loans, loans that cannot be payed back, in return for a further reduction in Greece's ability to pay back those loans in the first place. Extend and pretend, all the way. Nevermind the humanitarian cost or the threat to democracy itself.

It is either counter-productive or aimed at a different goal entirely. Greece wants an end to those loans, and all the loss of sovereignty that comes with it, while the Eurogroup in particular wants to stick to a program that only increased Greece's dependency to a point where they can throw the entire country into unbearable misery at a moment's notice (e.g. cut ELA access).

Take the privatisation demands as an example. The program demands that Greece agrees to sell specific property at a specific price. Both parties are keenly aware that this price cannot be realised during a fire sale, yet they still demand a promise by the Greeks to do so. Any promise would be a lie and everyone knows it.

Same for the demanded specificity of Greece's plans. After decades of nepotism, a fresh government made up entirely of outsiders is supposed to draw up plans of more detail than any previous government came up with. And they cannot even rely on the bureaucracy, given that a great number of people in it are part of the nepotic system they are trying to undo in the first place.

Taxes, same thing. The first king of Greece (1832'ish) was a prince of Bavaria who was accompanied by his own staff of finance experts, and they failed miserably. Greece went through occupation, military junta and decades of nepotism, and the new government is supposed to fix that within months.

Those demands cannot be met. The Greeks know it, the troika knows it, the Eurogroup knows it.

Zizek called it the superego in his recent piece on Syriza/Greece:

"The ongoing EU pressure on Greece to implement austerity measures fits perfectly what psychoanalysis calls the superego. The superego is not an ethical agency proper, but a sadistic agent, which bombards the subject with impossible demands, obscenely enjoying the subject’s failure to comply with them. The paradox of the superego is that, as Freud saw clearly, the more we obey its demands, the more we feel guilty. Imagine a vicious teacher who assigns his pupils impossible tasks, and then sadistically jeers when he sees their anxiety and panic. This is what is so terribly wrong with the EU demands/commands: they do not even give Greece a chance – Greek failure is part of the game."

Aside from all that, the entire continent is in a recession. Not enough demand, not enough investment, unsustainable levels of unemployment. Greece was hit hardest, Greece was hit first. It's not the cause of the problem, it is the canary in the coal mine. And Italy is already looking very shaky...

Paul Mason's reporting on this entire farce has been sublime, just like AEP's over at the Telegraph and YS's at NakedCapitalism.

And yes, that guy is representative of the views of our government as well as of significant parts of parliament. Pacta sunt servanda, there's a moral obligation to pay for your sins (debt = sin), and expansionary austerity works.

Economic creationists, loads and loads of 'em. And that's not even the worst of it. There are also plenty of folks who are eager to use debt as a means to extract resources and to subjugate entire countries -- colonialism redux.

The End of Austerity

How indeed.

Draghi's ECB has just made a move and I don't understand why. Come Feb 11th, they will no longer accept Greek bonds as collateral, effectively cutting off one of Greece's last two sources of credit. What remains is the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) provided to the Greek Central Bank, through which the entire banking system must now get most of its credit.

Why did they do it? Why now? I don't think it has something to do with the Advocate Generals opinion piece the other day, declaring the ECB's membership in the troika to be a conflict of interest and that fiscal policy is not to be used as a tool to influence poltical decision-making.

Could it be pure idiocy like the time they pulled to plug on Cyprus only to backpeddle shortly after? Or might they be trying to force a move on part of Germany and Greece? "Stop messing around and get your ducks in a row NOW." -- that sorta thing? Is it mere posturing of sorts, a shot across the bow of Greece?

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Edit #1

I really don't like this. It looks like disaster, smells like disaster and tastes like disaster. And it's entirely too close for comfort. Are they truly going to turn Greece into a failed-state over principle? The way they casually discuss the lives of nearly 11 million people, and the future of the European Union as well, is bone-chilling.
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In the meantime, Schäuble's meeting with Varoufakis went just as expected, reports indicate. Schäuble won't budge a bit. Negotiations with the troika are mandatory, and fiscal waterboarding must be resumed at once. There will be no compromise, not with him in charge. He'll push Greece off the cliff without blinking even once. Convictions worthy of a Templar, that one. Worth remembering that he admitted taking 100k in bribes from an arms dealer in '94 and still managed to become Minister of Finance. A living legend, just not the kind I'd prefer.

With regards to hyperinflation, most folks over here seem to have forgotten, or maybe they never learned, that Chancellor Brüning's austerity regime led to deflation in 1930-32, pushing unemployment to 23%. What followed was a massive influx in membership and infuence for parties at both ends of the political spectrum, similar to Greece. Except in our case, it wasn't the left (KPD) who won the elections in '32...

I liked the way the Reuters article closed:

It was not clear what support the German position, which appeared to take no account of the political change in Greece, will have in the wider euro zone talks.

I went against your advice and had a look at a DW article on the subject, and I see what you mean, there is quite a big disparity between the accepted position in the article and anything else I've read from outside Germany. I am now also left wondering how on earth any compromise could be made acceptable to German politicians, and then sold to the public. Since Ireland and Portugal are starting to recover despite The Austerity, it's entirely possible that the usual suspects will say "Look! It works!". They do have much more debt now though...

I can understand a certain aversion to excessive inflation, after the chaos caused by hyperinflation in 1923, but you'd think that if they remember that then they'd also remember where that led (and particularly with the rise of Golden Dawn).

As for Italy, it has somehow managed to muddle along on the edge of disaster for so long that I'm starting to think it can keep doing so forever.

I'm ashamed to say that I never thought of looking at the German press, my own sources have been British, so I had rather missed the perspective you report.

It's interesting that Syriza has been getting quite a lot of support from almost everyone except Angela Merkel. I'm starting to think that a pragmatic compromise of some sort or another is likely rather than a mexican stand off on The Austerity... the 5 month delay they are asking for takes them nicely past the Spanish elections and allows for much more face saving.

Now whether or not a deal can be reached, Syriza has rather larger problems than Germany and the ECB... they have been elected with a mandate to defeat generations of nepotism (Varoufakis himself describes it as a Kleptocracy), and while I wish them all the best, I'm quite curious as to how they plan to do so.

@radx

I think the problem with say a 20 year time frame for Greece, is that same lack of trust and political inability to essentially prop up these governments with cash, year on year, for a period of that kind of time frame. I don't see Merkel being able to support this and not get pushed out of government. Functionally money has a time value so in essence, a long time frame is just more money. Rumour is Merkel is considering extending time frames on Greek loans (because most people don't understand that last point) but that will only come with a greater commitment to reform.

As far as collective punishment, it's more an issue that none of the other EU countries are responsible. I wouldn't characterise anything as being forced upon Greece, although I'm sure many feel that way. If they were to leave and reject aid they would be far worse though. The majority of Greece rightly wants to stay in. The Syriza win was about 'dignity' and basically getting better terms. But they won't get it because it would lead to parties in Portugal/Spain emerging and demanding the same thing. Morality doesn't really come in to it, I'm just looking at what's likely and/or possible.

As you mentioned, Germany went through its own period of austerity. It certainly constrained wage growth (which contributed to making its exports particularly competitive and put it in a good position to weather a downturn in the eurozone, when it can export to foreign markets) but I don't believe its inflation rate was vastly off. It was 1-2%, not vastly different to France for example. Either way politically, I don't see the German people being willing to pay these countries out of their troubles in effect.

I certainly agree though that eurozone rules were broken before the euro crisis, e.g. both Germany & France ran budget deficits in excess of agreed terms. Really it came down to the structural weakness of the eurozone's design. You can't have a monetary union (shared currency and central bank policy) without a fiscal union. What they had at best were fiscal guidelines and those weren't followed.

I don't see the eurozone collapsing though. Parties that want to leave are generally still fringe parties (excluding in the UK but it is the least integrated). France doesn't need bailouts, it just lacks growth (due to lack of the reforms Germany went through). The ECB's QE and the loose banking union for bailing out banks that they've developed will mean if Greece collapses these is unlikely to be any serious bank collapses or Lehman moments (or so the theory goes).

I don't really agree at the end with your characterization of a high German savings rate being culpability for inflating bubbles. That fault falls on the lack of domestic bank regulation within the respective countries, the lack of regulation to curb bad lending. In the same way I wouldn't blame China's saving rate for encouraging sub-prime US loans. Cash/liquidity is globally mobile and fungible. It's the responsible of the borrowers and their regulators to ensure they don't dig themselves into a hole. The lenders already stand to lose their investment if the loan goes bad.

In the current situation, "structural reforms" is used to subsume two entirely different sets of measures.

The first is meant to remove what you previously mentioned: corruption in all the shapes and forms it takes in Greece, from a (intentionally) broken tax system formed over decades of nepotism to a bankrupt national media in the hands of oligarchs. The institutions of the Greek state are precisely what you expect when a country has been run by four families (Papandreou, Samaras, Mitsotakis, Karamanlis) for basically five decades.

This kind of structural reform is part of Syriza's program. Like you said, it'll be hard work and they might very well fail. They'll have only weeks, maybe a few months to undo significant parts of what has grown over half a century. It's not fair, but that's what it is.

The second kind of "structural reform" is meant to increase competitiveness, generally speaking, and a reduction of the public sector. In case of Greece, this included the slashing of wages, pensions, benefits, public employment. The economic and social results are part of just about every article these days, so I won't mention them again. A Great Depression, as predicted.

That's the sort of "structural reforms" Syriza wants to undo. And it's the sort that is expected of Spain, Italy and France as well, which, if done, would probably throw the entire continent into a Great Depression.

I'd go so far as to call any demand to increase competitiveness to German levels madness. Germany gained its competitiveness by 15 years of beggar-thy-neighbour economics, undercutting the agreed upon target of ~2% inflation (read: 2% growth of unit labour costs) the entire time. France played by the rules, was on target the entire time, and is now expected to suffer for it. Only Greece was significantly above target, and are now slightly below target. That's only halfway, yet already more than any democratic country can take.

They could have spread the adjustment out over 20 years, with Germany running above average ULC growth, but decided to throw Greece (and to a lesser degree Spain) off a cliff instead.


So where are we now? Debt rose, GDP crashed, debt as percentage of GDP skyrocketed. That's a fail. Social situation is miserable, health care system basically collapsed, reducing Greece to North African standards. That's a fail.

Those are not reforms to allow Greece to function independently. Those are reforms to throw the Greek population into misery, with ever increasing likeliness of radical solutions (eg Golden Dawn, who are eagerly hoping for a failure of Syriza).

So yes, almost every nation in Europe needs reforms of one sort or another. But using austerity as a rod to beat discipline into supposedly sovereign nations is just about the shortest way imaginable to blow up the Eurozone. Inflicting this amount of pain on people against their will does not work in democratic countries, and the rise of Syriza, Podemos, Sinn Féin, the SNP and the Greens as well as the surge of popularity for Front National and Golden Dawn are clear indicators that the current form of politics cannot be sustained.

Force austerity on France and Le Pen wins the election.

Meaningful reforms that are to increase Europe's "prosperity" would have the support of the people. And reforms are definatly needed, given that the Eurozone is in its fifth year of stagnation, with many countries suffering from both a recession and deflation. A European Union without increasing prosperity for the masses will not last long, I'm sure of it. And a European Union that intentionally causes Great Depressions wouldn't be worth having anyway.

Yet after everything is said and done, I believe you are still absolutely correct in saying that the pro-austerity states won't blink.

Which is what makes it interesting, really. Greece might be able to take a default. They run a primary surplus and most (90%+) of the funds went to foreign banks, the ECB and the IMF anyway, or were used to stabilize the banking system. The people got bugger all. But the Greek banking system would collapse without access to the European system.

Which raises the question: would the pro-austerity states risk a collapse of the Greek banking system and everything it entails? Spanish banks would follow in a heartbeat.

As for the morality of it (they elected those governments, they deserved it): I don't believe in collective punishment, especially not the kind that cripples an entire generation, which is what years of 50+% youth unemployment and a failing educational system does.

My own country, Germany, in particular gets no sympathy from me in this case. Parts of our system were intentionally reformed to channel funds into the market, knowing full well that there was nowhere near enough demand for credit to soak up the surplus savings, nowhere near enough reliable debtors to generate a reasonable return of investment without generating bubbles, be it real estate or financial. They were looking for debtors, and if all it took was turning a blind eye to the painfully obvious longterm problems it would create in Southern Europe, they were more than eager to play along.

Nothing is good about this situation and there is no reason to think this will end in anything but Greek default.

Greece's government, elected by its citizens ran up a large and unsustainable debt which was masked by easy credit before the GFC and fraudulent accounting.

There were many contributors. Corruption, hugely wasteful state owned enterprises, joining the euro zone before they were ready to lose the ability to devalue their currency and lower interest rates, and flagrant tax evasion.

But as a country they're collectively responsible for not demanding the necessary reforms of their politicians to ensure they were not vulnerable to a credit crisis when the GFC hit and lenders began to look more scrupulously at individual European countries rather than Europe as a whole. Equally, Italy is responsible for voting Berlusconi into power for every year their economy recorded negative growth under his government. Spain is responsible for not providing sufficient oversight to bad bank lending leading a huge indebting bailout package.

Some of Syriza's reforms are reasonable. Tackling corruption and trying to break up oligopolies are worthy ideas, but they are unlikely to be easy and yield any immediate benefit. Raising the minimum wage and planning to hire back state workers as they have already promised will almost guarantee they will cease to receive EU funding/ECB assistance and later IMF funding.

The simple truth from the point of view of Germany and other austerity backing Nordic countries is if they buy their loans (and in effect transfer money to Greece) without austerity stipulations, there will be no pressure or guarantee that structural reforms that allow Greece to function independently will ever be implemented. These lender government and by extension its people have no interest in transferring wealth to Greece if it stalls its reforms.

Yes fire sales of state owned enterprises suck but the likely alternative at this point if the Troika lending is stopped is that all other lending stops and Greece defaults. At that point there would be mass loss of state sector jobs and sky-rocketing unemployment relative to what is now being experienced. It would take years of reform for the Greek government to be lend-worthy again. There is simply no trust for any alternative to austerity on the part of north Europe.

Currently Greece has reported positive growth in the past quarter and excluding debt repayments is running a budget surplus. Realistically, yes they cannot pay back the 180% of GDP. The likely way forward is after several more years of real reform they (+ Spain & Portugal) would get better terms from the EU as politically, leaders in Germany and elsewhere will be able to make the case that their objective has been achieved.

The ECB's QE package is in some ways already part of this. What I guarantee won't happen is electing Syriza to oppose bailout terms helping to secure that. Germany et al will quite rightly see that if they acquiesce to Greece they will encourage other populist parties in Spain, Portugal, Italy and France and stall reforms.

Could Germany and others in theory provide a huge cash infusion to Greece, Spain and Portugal now? Sure. And those parties would be voted out in the next election and the terms reversed. Even with the relative stinginess of current loan terms, the likes of UKIP and the National Front with their anti-EU stance, have gained political standing in the EU parliament and will likely see huge boosts in upcoming domestic elections.

Not the entire rest, actually. Just the pro-austerity forces currently running the show (Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Austria, etc). Syriza have strong support in Spain (Podemos), France and Italy, the three major countries on the receiving end of austerity.

If Varoufakis' analysis of the situation in Europe is correct, almost everything the troika (ECB, IMF, European Commission) has done since the beginning of the crisis was counterproductive and the underlying economic theories were wrong, plain and simple.

It would be an open challenge to conservative ideology in European governments and to a sort of market fundamentalism that has been the overwhelming drive behind most major policies enacted over the last two decades, particularly in the last seven years.

Can't have that. The Emperor is not naked. Greece is not bankrupt, austerity leads to growth and deflation poses no risk.

25% unemployment, 50+% youth unemployment, GDP down by 25%, poverty through the roof, dumpster diving on the richest continent on the planet -- whatever led to this (hint: austerity) needs a special place on the wall of things never to be done again.

Yet they want to implement it in France and Italy as well, which is why the conflict with Greece is actually a high stakes game about the future of the entire Eurozone.

Like I said, my own views are heavily biased against austerity for a multitude of reasons. And to see my own government forcing it upon significant parts of the continent makes me sick.

About 15 months ago, at a conference in Austin aptly titled "Can the Eurozone be saved?", my favorite Greek mathematician/economist Yanis Varoufakis made center stage with his "Modest Proposal".

Now that he's in charge of Greece's finances, the media is firing broadside after broadside at him, trying their best to discredit the man. Doesn't even wear a tie, shaves his head, wears biker jackets, has a temper... the usual ad hominem bullshit. Yet it only took him three days to give the debate a new direction. Calling the austerity program "fiscal waterboarding" was a stroke of genius.

Him and Tsipras created the first crack in this bubble of lunacy that we call Eurozone. Someone might even realize that the Emperor is, in fact, naked.

Oh, and my personal word of the week: Stahlhelmökonom

(lit.: steel helmet economist, as in "a level of denial and ignorance made famous by the German military on the Eastern front" applied to economics)

148...

If Syriza pulls it off and truly tells the banks and the troika to shove it up their collective asses, the banks in particular will throw Greece into a world of pain. With silent support by several governments within the EU, including my own, mind you. Any defiance must be crushed or else Spain will be right on track for a Podemos government.

And if Syriza caves and doesn't end the tyranny of austerity, Golden Dawn will become the only credible anti-austerity party -- the fucking Neo-Nazis.

The stakes are high, my friend. I haven't been this nervous in quite some time.