search results matching tag: Basel

» channel: learn

go advanced with your query
Search took 0.000 seconds

  • 1
    Videos (14)     Sift Talk (0)     Blogs (1)     Comments (6)   

Too Big to Fail and Getting Bigger

RedSky says...

The Basel 3 accords are essentially doing this. Basel and its previous incarnations are essentially non-binding guidelines established by an international agency for banks that domestic regulatory agencies in countries then enact. Even if they don't, banks follow these anyway because it's effectively an international standard.

Basel 2 (which we had prior to the GFC), had 2 tiers of capital that could be held. The actual shareholder stock capital that is rock solid (tier 1) and various loose definitions (including at the time AAA rated mortage backed securities) - tier 2. The last I heard, that 2nd tier has essentially been done away with and the overall capital requirements (%) required to be held, has been raised.

The problems though are:

1 - Unless you raise capital to stupendous levels (like seriously inhibiting bank lending), you wouldn't have anywhere near the buffer to prevent another 2008. The problem then was not insufficient capital. It's that the industry as a whole made a large judgement error in valuing mortgage backed securities.

2 - This also highlights the problem that breaking up the banks wouldn't solve the issue of groupthink because availability of credit and economic conditions are a universal thing. An analogy is the oil price. Even though the US is a major oil producer in it's own right, events like Iraq recently still heavily impact prices in the US because global prices don't change in a vacuum.

3 - As far Glass Steigel, even if investment and traditional banks were separate, operating in the same field, if credit dries up (say because a investment bank made a bad decision), that will still affect the traditional merchant banks.

All banks work through fractional lending. You take a deposit, keep a buffer for capital. You lend out the rest. Some returns back as a deposit, again you keep a buffer and lend out the rest. In bad economic conditions, regardless of whether caused by them or other players in the finance industry, some of their lenders default and there is potential for their entire capital buffer to collapse and the bank to default if the crisis is bad enough. Even if it's purely a merchant bank.

-

What splitting the banks probably would do is increase competition, and lower banking costs as well as salaries, which is generally a good thing and I would agree here that this is something that banks have lobbied heavily against (as well as things like the Consumer Protection Agency, for the same reason, margins). Having said that, there are a lot much more monopolistic companies with lower risk and much more stable margins (e.g. Wallmart).

charliem said:

The issue with telling the banks to just raise more capital, without changing the regulations....means they would just leverage that extra capital to increase their profits yet again.

It adds fuel and oxyegn to the fire, they have a feduciary responsibility to behave like this too, as they are publically listed entities.

The only way to fix this, is to regulate the leveraging ratios they can use. That FORCES them to both reduce the risky behavior, and increase their capital levels.

But good luck with that one, you think lobbyists are strong? Id like to see how much money lobbyists make trying to defend the banks from losing their profits.

Unless of course you re-enact glass steigel act, forcing the investment banking arms to separate away from the traditional banking arms....again, damaging bank corporation's overall profits (they lose the mum and pop capital in their vaults to use as investment leverage....less profit)

Wont...ever....happen. Ever.

Mark Knopfler holding the audience in the palm of his guitar

RSA Animate: Crises of Capitalism

RedSky says...

I lose interest the moment someone says greedy bankers. Bankers are no more greedy than any corporate entity. Like any element of a capitalist economy they provide a benefit for someone and derive a benefit themselves. The term greedy gets lumped on them for two main reasons:

1: Because their benefit is hard to concteputalise: that they're effectively redistributing capital into lucrative investments and taking a slither out of the borrowing and lending rate spread, thereby creating jobs and growing the economy. Everyone is impacted by this, but indirectly enough that they don't realise it. As far as investment banking goes, and the argument that they're gambling, again it's unwarranted. In every derivative transaction that involves say a farm producer wanting to transfer their risk away, there has to be a speculative counterparty to take this on. The risk doesn't disappear after all. Without speculators, this would be impossible. As far as endangering the entire economy, see point 2.

2: They make arguably excessive profits and have grown to a tremendous size relative to other aspects of the economy. You could make various arguments for why this is case. For one, you can say they have been exploiting moral hazard, the expectation by themselves and their investors that they will be bailed out if they were to collapse en-masse, thus allowing them more favourable borrowing rates and to take larger risks than otherwise and thereby earn higher returns as a result. The finance reform bill in the US and revisions to the Basel standards are expected to considerably address this and demonstrate that is a failure of regulation and not some inherent and idiosyncratic greediness. Any industry or firm given potential loopholes, or monopolistic market power exploits it, it has and always will be the job of regulators to prevent this just as with bank moral hazard.

Not to mention he completely goes off the rails when he starts contrasting rising finance with falling manufacturing. Two entirely different industries, where the latter was heavily impacted by free trade and automation advances and the prior wasn't. Pity, I thought the first half of the talk was altogether well done.

Goldman Sachs are scum - At least someone's saying it

EndAll says...

"The real menace of our Republic is the invisible government which like a giant octopus sprawls its slimy legs over our cities states and nation. At the head is a small group of banking houses generally referred to as 'international bankers.' This little coterie... run our government for their own selfish ends. It operates under cover of a self-created screen...[and] seizes...our executive officers... legislative bodies... schools... courts... newspapers and every agency created for the public protection."

"The powers of financial capitalism had (a) far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent meetings and conferences. The apex of the systems was to be the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a private bank owned and controlled by the world's central banks which were themselves private corporations. Each central bank...sought to dominate its government by its ability to control Treasury loans, to manipulate foreign exchanges, to influence the level of economic activity in the country, and to influence cooperative politicians by subsequent economic rewards in the business world."

"The few who could understand the system will either be so interested in its profits, or so dependent on its favours, that there will be no opposition from that class, while on the other hand, the great body of the people mentally incapable of comprehending the tremendous advantage that capital derives from the system, will bear its burdens without complaint, and perhaps without even suspecting that the system is inimical to their interests."

This guy speaks the truth.. I can't blame him for seeming so frustrated.

Top Gear tests the new Ford Fiesta... thoroughly.

Helping Wall Street != Helping Main Street

winkler1 says...

Roubini has some very good ideas on how to do this right, and not be a scam:

HOME (Home Owners’ Mortgage Enterprise): A 10 Step Plan to Resolve the Financial Crisis
Nouriel Roubini | Sep 24, 2008

Even if the Treasury TARP plan is implemented fairly and efficiently the US will not avoid a severe U-shaped18-month recession and a severe financial and banking crisis: the recession train has already left the station in Q1 and the financial/banking crisis will be severe regardless of what the Treasury and the Fed do from now on. What a proper rescue plan can do is to avoid having the US experience a multi-year L-shaped recession and extreme financial crisis like the one that led to a decade long stagnation in Japan in the 1990s after the bursting of their real estate and equity bubbles.

I have also argued that, in order to resolve this financial crisis it is not enough to take the bad/toxic assets off the balance sheet of the financial institutions (a new RTC); it is also necessary and fundamental to reduce the debt overhang of millions of insolvent households via a significant debt reduction on their mortgages (an HOLC program like the one that was implement during the Great Depression); and also recapitalize undercapitalized banks with public capital in the form of preferred shares (as the RFC did with 4000 banks during the Great Depression). An RTC scheme without an HOLC and RFC component would not resolve two fundamental problems: millions of households are insolvent and unable to service their mortgages; the financial system is vastly undercapitalized and needs capital to avoid an ugly credit crunch and to foster new credit creation that is needed for future growth.

That is why I proposed the creation of a HOME (Home Owners’ Mortgage Enterprise) that would be a combination of an RTC, a HOLC and a RFC. Let me flesh out this proposal and its key elements and compare it to the Treasury TARP proposal that in its current form has many flaws.

There are 10 steps in this HOME proposal to resolve this most severe financial crisis. Here they are:

First, like in the Treasury TARP plan you need to buy illiquid/toxic assets and take them off the balance sheet of banks and financial institutions to reliquify them and allow new credit creation. The biggest problem here – as the debate between Bernanke and senators yesterday is one of the proper valuation and the proper price at which the government should buy these assets (the RTC did not have this problem as it was working out assets of failed S&Ls): if the government buys the asset at at price that is too high (too small of discount relative to face value) the fiscal cost will be huge and you massively subsidize reckless bankers and their shareholders. If you buy at a discount that is too high you minimize the fiscal cost in the short run but many banks could go bust and the eventual fiscal cost of bailing out the depositors of failed banks could be large. You can debate endlessly whether such assets should be bought at current market price or at prices closer to hold to maturity values (as Bernanke suggested). Given that these assets are impaired pricing the long run value of them is mission impossible. Thus, there is only one solution to this fundamental uncertainty: avoid the government overpaying by having the government having some of the positive benefits of an upside gain in case the banks’ values recover after the bailout. I.e. you need for the government to have some equity in the banks whose assets are purchased by the government. This leads to step 2 of the proposal.

Second, in exchange for the purchase of illiquid asset (at whatever price it is agreed) the government gets preferred shares in the financial institutions that senior to existing common and preferred shares and that are convertible into common shares to allow government to participate into any future upside.

Third, even if the government gets preferred shares as in step 2, the banks will need more capital if they are undercapitalized and they have not fully reserved/provisioned for the losses coming from writing down the asset being sold to the government. So you will need to inject further actual public capital in the form of preferred shares in the financial institutions ( this is what the RFC did during the Great Depression).

Fourth, given the risk to the government deriving from the public injection of capital in the financial system the existing shareholders of the banks need to take a first-tier loss to minimize the risks for the government share. How to do that? First, you need to suspend dividend payments on common share and possibly even existing preferred shared; you also need to force to partially match the public capital injection with new Tier 1 capital.

Fifth, public and private recapitalization of financial institutions unfairly benefits unsecured creditors (all creditors but insured depositors) of such institutions. So, you also need to convert some of this unsecured debt (the sub debt and other debt unsecured debt) into equity (a debt for equity swap). Such swap further reduce the leverage of the financial system (leading to a lower debt to equity ratio for financial institutions).

Sixth, after this crisis is resolved the banking and financial system may need lower capital than before this crisis so as to avoid new asset and credit bubbles; and if you recapitalize some banks that will be able to lend more (still with lower leverage ratios) you still need to let other insolvent banks and financial institutions to go bust and disappear. Only healthier institution should survive. So you need to a systematic triage between banks that are distressed, undercapitalized and illiquid but solvent once the private and public recapitalization occurs from those that are fundamentally insolvent and that need to be shut down. You need to destroy the bad apples to let the good ones or the sick but curable ones survive and thrive.

Seventh, as in the case of the RTC the assets of the banks that are bankrupt and are allowed to fail go to the HOME for workout (debt restructuring/reduction).

Eighth, you need an HOLC-like program for debt reduction of the household sector. Households in the US have too much debt (subprime, near prime, prime mortgages, home equity loans, credit cards, auto loans and student loans) while their assets (values of their homes and stocks) are plunging leading to a sharp fall in their net worth. And households are getting buried under this mountain of mounting debt and rising debt servicing burdens. Thus, a fraction of the household sector – as well as a fraction of the financial sector and a fraction of the corporate sector and of the local government sector – is insolvent and needs debt relief. When a country (say Russia, Ecuador or Argentina) has too much debt and is insolvent it defaults and gets debt reduction and is then able to resume fast growth; when a firm is distressed with excessive debt it goes into bankruptcy court and gets debt relief that allows it to resume investment, production and growth; when a household is financially distressed it also needs debt relief to be able to have more discretionary income to spend. So any unsustainable debt problem requires debt reduction. The lack of debt relief to the distressed households is the reason why this financial crisis is becoming more severe and the economic recession - with a sharp fall now in real consumption spending – now worsening. The fiscal actions taken so far (income relief to households via tax rebates) and bailouts of distressed financial institutions (Bear Stearns creditors’ bailout, Fannie and Freddie and AIG) do not resolve the fundamental debt problem for two reasons. First, you cannot grow yourself out of a debt problem: when debt to disposable income is too high increasing the denominator with tax rebates is ineffective and only temporary; i.e. you need to reduce the nominator (the debt). Second, rescuing distressed institutions without reducing the debt problem of the borrowers does not resolve the fundamental insolvency of the debtor that limits its ability to consume and spend and thus drags the economy into a more severe economic contraction. So of the five possible uses of fiscal policy – income relief to households (the 2008 tax rebate), rescue/bailout of financial institutions (Bears Stearns, Fannie and Freddie, AIG), purchase of assets of failed institutions (an RTC-like institution), recapitalization of undercapitalized financial institutions (an RFC-like institution), government purchase of distressed mortgages to provide debt relief to households (an HOLC-like institution) – the last option is the most important and effective to resolve this severe financial and economic crisis. During the Great Depression the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was create to buy mortgages from bank at a discount price, reduce further the face value of such mortgages and refinance distressed homeowners into new mortgages with lower face value and lower fixed rate mortgage rates. This massive program allowed millions of households to avoid losing their homes and ending up in foreclosure. The HOLC bought mortgages for two year and managed such assets for 18 years at a relatively low fiscal cost (as the assets were bought at a discount and reducing the face value of the mortgages allowed home owners to avoid defaulting on the refinanced mortgages). A new HOLC will be the macro equivalent of creating a large “bad bank” where the bad assets of financial institutions are taken off their balance sheets and restructured/reduced.

Ninth, we need to avoid a situation where the recapitalization of the banks and the resolution of this financial crisis leads to another credit and asset bubble. Many things need to be done to avoid this risk but a rapid change of the Basel II capital adequacy ratios to reduce their the pro-cyclicality would be essential.

Tenth, start implementing rapidly a reform of the system of regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial globalization. With the collapse of most of the shadow banking system most of these shadow banks are now being folded in the traditional banks and will be regulated like banks. Indeed all institutions of large size and that are systemically important (commercial banks, investment banks, non-bank mortgage lenders, hedge funds, private equity funds, etc.) should be supervised and regulated in a similar way. To make the financial system more stable over time and avoid severe financial crises like the current one will require that both banks and former shadow banks be regulated and supervised better than they have been in the last decade. After all traditional banks have performed as poorly – and some more poorly – and have lost more money than shadow banks during this severe financial crisis. So both the poor regulation and supervision of banks (as regulators were asleep at the wheel while the laissez fair ideology and voodoo-cult of self-regulation and market discipline and internal risk management became dominant) and the lack of sensible regulation of shadow banks lies behind the current financial disaster. Thus, folding shadow banks back into the traditional banking system will make the overall financial system more stable only if the proper reform of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial globalization will be undertaken. This important matter is the subject of the chapter (titled “Financial Crises, Financial Stability, and Reform: Supervision and Regulation of the Financial System in a World of Financial Globalization”) that I have written for the recently published World Economic Forum’s Financial Development Report.

This chapter analyzes in detail the episodes of financial crisis in emerging market economies and advanced economy; discusses the causes and consequences of such crisis; measures the economic and fiscal costs of such crises; discusses the debate on whether monetary and credit policy should target asset prices and asset bubbles; studies the weaknesses of financial regulation and supervision in advanced economies financial systems that led to the recent crises; and finally considers eleven separate key issues in the reform of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial globalization that are necessary to prevent future crisis and make them less virulent. These eleven issues that are key in reforming financial regulation and supervision are: the distorted compensation system of bankers/traders and the related agency problems between financial institutions shareholders and their managers; the flaws of the originate and distribute securitization model; regulatory arbitrage and the instability of the shadow banking system given its reliance on short term liquid financing, high leverage and long term illiquid lending; the weaknesses of self-regulation and market discipline and the need of greater rules-based regulation; pro-cyclical capital requirements and other issues with the Basel II capital requirements; the distorted incentives of credit rating agencies; asset valuation and fair value accounting in a world where assets can be highly illiquid and hard to price; the lack of transparency in financial markets; the inadequate regulatory regime; the lack of international coordination of regulatory policies; and the issue of who will regulate the regulators, i.e. how to avoid the regulatory capture by the financial industry of the regulators and supervisors of financial institutions.

So now that the shadow banking system is being folded in the formal banking system it is high time to rethink how both banks and the former non-bank financial institutions should be properly regulated and supervised.

http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/253739/home_home_owners_mortgage_enterprise_a_10_step_plan_to_resolve_the_financial_crisis

  • 1


Send this Article to a Friend



Separate multiple emails with a comma (,); limit 5 recipients






Your email has been sent successfully!

Manage this Video in Your Playlists

Beggar's Canyon